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ABSTRACT 
Daniel Congdon, M.A. Summer 2014                                                                                          Philosophy 
Restoration as Caring Practice: A Relational Perspective on Ecological Recovery 
Chairperson or Co-Chairperson: Deborah Slicer 
   Ecological restoration is defined by the Society for Ecological Restoration (SER) as “the process of 
assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged or destroyed” (9).  In practice, 
restoration typically involves the removal of pollution, human-made structures (like dams or roads), 
invasive species, and other impediments to ecological health.  Removing the sources of ecological 
impairment is coupled with the reintroduction of flora, fauna, and the physical structures that are 
necessary for healthy ecosystem function.   
   The potential for restoration to dominate nature is a concern of environmental ethicists.  In theory, 
domination might stem from the technology used in restoration or the presence and expression of 
human intentions and ideals.  But are such concerns apparent in restored sites? Theoretical concerns 
about domination of nature and other issues in restoration must be grounded in the realities of 
ecological restoration as it is practiced.  Connecting theory to practice allows us to better understand 
how the concerns of the philosopher can be perceived and addressed by the practitioners of restoration.   
   I argue that the ethics of care, and my care perspective that I develop, provide unique insights into the 
issue of domination in restoration.  I apply the relational context and alternative perspectives on 
autonomy, the self, and universal versus contextual moral principles that care brings to the issues in 
restoration.  In doing so, I argue that my care perspective gives a better account of ecosystem autonomy 
(as it relates to domination), questions the ecosystems as moral entities with a unified set of interests, 
and a way to understand partiality or favoritism as a morally acceptable way to make difficult decisions 
in restoration.       
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Restoration as Caring Practice: A Relational Perspective on Ecological Recovery1  
Introduction 
Ecological restoration is defined by the Society for Ecological Restoration (SER) as “the process 
of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged or destroyed” (Clewell and 
Aronson, 3).  In practice, restoration typically involves the removal of pollution, human-made structures 
(like dams or roads), invasive species, and other impediments to ecological health.  Removing the 
sources of ecological impairment is coupled with the reintroduction of flora, fauna, and the physical 
structures that are necessary for healthy ecosystem function.  For example, the restoration of the Clark 
Fork River in western Montana, so far, has involved removing sediment from the floodplain of the river 
that had been polluted by mine tailings, removing a hydroelectric dam, reconstructing the river bank, 
and replanting the banks and floodplain.  This work, although not without its own controversies and 
shortcomings, has decreased water pollution (The Clark Fork Coalition: Quality of Groundwater) and 
allowed for trout to repopulate once fishless stretches of the river and its tributaries (The Clark Fork 
Coalition: Healing Streams).   
Restoration is guided by an understanding of what is in the interest of ecosystems and their 
members, including and often prioritizing the human members.  The difficulty of accurately and 
equitably representing a variety of often competing interests is one way that restoration generates 
complex ethical questions.  How these questions are answered and how different sets of values are 
expressed through the design and implementation of a restoration project are important challenges for 
restorationists.  The lives of all types of organisms and the livelihoods of people can hinge on how a 
                                                          
1     I want to acknowledge the Philosophy Department at the University of Montana for creating an excellent 
program for environmental philosophy that promotes theoretical work alongside hands-on experiences.  Special 
thanks to my advisor and chair Deborah Slicer for her encouragement and high standards throughout this thesis 
process.  Thank you to Albert Borgmann, Christopher Preston, and Daniel Spencer for their challenging and 
engaging classes and their feedback on this thesis.  To my fellow students I thank you for the conversations that 
helped me to articulate and refine my thoughts here in this thesis.   
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restoration project is implemented.  For restoration to avoid misuse and fulfill a positive role in the 
human-nature relationship, it is important to choose an appropriate ethical theory to frame questions 
and guide practices.  This is where philosophy can contribute to the improvement of restoration.   
In the field of environmental philosophy, the first responses to the theory and practice of 
ecological restoration were intensely critical.  Robert Elliot argued that environmentalists should fight 
against restoration because of its potential to be misused by large companies and government 
organizations.  Eric Katz, another early opponent to restoration, doubted that restoration could produce 
anything of natural value and claimed that restoration could only result in the production of a human-
centered artifact.  More recently, some philosophy of restoration has developed towards a positive and 
pragmatic approach.  For Eric Higgs and William Jordan, the hope that restoration embodies is twofold.  
First, it is a practice that can address the widespread ecological impairment that has been left in the 
wake of industrial development, and second, it can serve as a new cultural tradition and means to repair 
the human-nature relationship.  There are both cultural and ecological damages that restoration can 
address.  However, to some extent, all of these authors recognize that there are risks associated with 
even the best forms of restoration.   
Regarding the commonly recognized risks and challenges, some of the open questions in the 
philosophy of restoration are: 1) how can restoration avoid the pitfalls of domination (of both people 
and nature)? 2) How should distinct human and ecological values be balanced and represented in 
restoration? And, 3) can restoration be the basis for a new paradigm of environmentalism?   
In this thesis I will argue that a care perspective2 provides a favorable ethical framework for 
assessing the ethical issues in restoration.  Eric Higgs, William Jordan, and Colette Palamar make 
arguments which are suggestive of a care perspective, but it is worthwhile to make the connection 
                                                          
2     The care ethics perspective will be discussed in length in chapter three.  I draw from both care ethics and also 
care-sensitive ethics to form what I call my care perspective in this thesis.   
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between care and restoration explicit.  Beyond clarifying this connection, I also employ a care 
perspective to assess and respond to three perspectives of domination within restoration literature.   
My thesis will consist of three chapters.  The first two chapters set the stage for the third 
chapter, which is where I see the bulk of my contribution to restoration philosophy.  Chapter one will dig 
into some of the well-known essays on the topic of restoration and some less-cited, but nonetheless 
important, recent contributions.  My literature review will make clear the lines of argumentation, the 
angle or approach, authors have used to critique and support the ethical status of ecological restoration.  
From this review I will pick out some questions that remain to be answered or that would benefit from 
further clarification.  In chapter two I will show that these issues in the philosophical debate over 
restoration are instantiated in actual restoration projects.  The questions that practitioners of 
restoration face on the ground do in fact link up with the conceptual issues that philosophers discuss.  In 
the third and final chapter I will respond to the questions that I picked out in the first chapter and 
connected with grounded examples in the second.  The third chapter will be based on my understanding 
of the feminist ethical theory, care ethics.  This branch of ethical theory has been largely absent from 
the literature on restoration and is a favorable theory for addressing the ethical issues in restoration.   
From my care perspective I focus on three different aspects of domination in restoration.  
Responding to Eric Katz’s criticisms of domination in restoration, I look at the view of autonomy he 
assumes and assigns to ecosystems.  In response I suggest that the alternative understanding of 
autonomy from care ethics shows why restoration is not necessarily a dominating practice.  Second I 
consider Eric Higgs’ notion of wild design, a condition of restoration that encourages us to find a balance 
between human and ecosystem interests.  While I find wild design to be a concept that matches up well 
with a care perspective, I argue that Eric Higgs and others ought to consider the depth and complexity of 
what ecosystems and their interests amount to.  I argue that responsibilities of care, as they pertain to 
particular needs of individuals and the goal of creating caring communities, shows that we can’t care for 
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ecosystems as individuals.  Lastly, I respond to Colette Palamar who adapts Karen Warren’s ecofeminist 
perspective to ecological restoration.  She concludes that in order to avoid domination the goal of 
restoration should be to increase the possibilities, i.e. the self-directedness, of ecosystems. My response 
is that this requires an unneeded degree of impartiality and I explain how care ethics, in some 
circumstances, shows that partiality towards those that we are in relationships with is favorable over 
impartial moral principles.    
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1. Restoration Philosophy: Review of the Debate and Issues  
In this chapter I review some of the hallmark works in the philosophy of ecological restoration, 
as well as some more recent works, that together represent a development of thought about 
restoration.  The purpose of this chapter is to distill some of the risks, challenges, and benefits of 
restoration that emanate from the literature.  Which critiques reference qualities essential to 
restoration?  Which are concerns about patterns of human mistreatment of nature more generally?  
What are the limits and appropriate goals of restoration? In chapter two I show how these moral 
aspects of restoration are instantiated in practice.  In chapter three, I provide an analysis of these same 
issues from a care perspective.      
One can hardly read an article about the philosophy of restoration that doesn’t reference the 
early work by Robert Elliot and Eric Katz.  These two opponents of restoration were some of the first to 
speak up against the practice, Elliot’s first article being published in 1982.  While Elliot has since 
softened his critique, Katz remains adamantly opposed to restoration.  A great number of authors 
writing today still refer to their early work, and for good reason.  The pessimism and mistrust that they 
express about the inevitability of resource extraction industries and environmental policymakers to use 
restoration deceptively remains a concern.  But the optimists of restoration have a compelling case as 
well.  Eric Higgs and William Jordan express a contagious excitement about the prospect of restoring not 
only the damaged natural world, but also our relationship with it.       
Philosophers who are skeptical of restoration worry that efforts to recover a damaged 
ecosystem will be used as an excuse to further unwarranted anthropocentric interests.  This is a concern 
for Robert Elliot, who was one of the first critics of restoration.  In “Faking Nature” Elliot seeks to refute 
the “restoration thesis,” (142) as he calls it.  This is the claim that “the destruction of what has value is 
compensated for by the later creation (recreation) of something of equal value” (142).  He goes on to 
claim that “restoration policies do not always fully restore value because part of the reason that we 
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value bits of the environment is because they are natural to a high degree” (144).  A reasonable follow 
up to this claim would be to ask what makes something more or less “natural.”  His response is that 
natural entities, like ecosystems, derive at least some of their value from having a particular history, in 
this case, a natural history.  By this account, an ecosystem is natural to the extent that its causal history 
is free from human intervention.  As Elliot puts it, “the environmentalist’s complaint concerning 
restoration proposals is that nature is not replaceable without depreciation in one aspect of its value 
which has to do with its genesis, its history” (146).    
Elliot then makes an analogy between art forgery and restoration to show that one of the 
reasons that we value an original work of art is because it has a particular “causal genesis,” or history.  In 
the case of art, we value not just the finished work, but its connection to a particular painter, a time, 
place, and other details attached to it.  Like art, ecosystems are also valued in part because their current 
state can be attributed to natural processes, in other words, processes free of human intervention.  
According to this line of thinking, restoration is thus a fake or forgery because it relies on human means, 
not natural forces which created it initially, to re-create an ecosystem.  Causal genesis simply cannot be 
replaced; it is lost when the original is destroyed.  Because the causal genesis, or history, of an 
ecosystem cannot be recovered, the full value of the ecosystem cannot be recovered either.  Therefore, 
restoration, as defined by Elliot’s restoration thesis, can’t do what it claims it can, namely, fully restoring 
natural value of ecosystems.  Restoration is deceptive in Elliot’s view because it tries to pass off a 
forgery of nature as if it were the real thing.    
From the conclusion that restoration can’t do what it claims, Elliot then moves to say that we 
ought to reject restoration in favor of conservation.3  In his view, it is only through conservation, that is, 
                                                          
3     Although Elliot uses the term conservation, his idea of restricting human intervention in nature reflects what is 
often referred to as preservation, as in wilderness preservation.  The preservationist mode of land management is 
marked by a “leave no trace” and “take only pictures, leave only footprints” philosophy that encourages hands-off 
means of keeping areas in an untrammeled condition.   
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a hands-off mode of management, that natural value can be saved.  To save nature, we must protect it 
from human manipulation.  Alternatively, if we embrace restoration, we will thereby undermine 
conservation efforts.  Managing with restoration instead of conservation will lead to a greater loss of 
natural value because of restoration’s false pretense that any ecologically destructive act can be wholly 
remedied.  Elliot concludes by saying that his argument provides empirical grounds to reject the 
“restoration thesis” and that this strategy should be employed by environmentalists in order to defeat 
restoration.  However, it is important to recognize that Elliot’s argument does not provide grounds to 
reject restoration wholesale.   
Elliot’s critique of restoration only holds true if restorationists adhere to the restoration thesis.  
If restorationists do not claim that they can restore the full value of a degraded ecosystem, in other 
words, if they accept that restoration is not an attempt to precisely replicate what was destroyed, then 
it seems Elliot’s charge does not apply.  Restorationists could simply state that they are trying to improve 
an ecosystem that has been damaged without claiming that their work will come anywhere near a 
perfect re-creation.  Those promoting and practicing restoration could (and often do) agree with Elliot 
that their end product will be of less (natural) value than the original.  It certainly would have been 
better if the ecosystem had never been damaged in the first place.  However, restorationists are still 
adding some value back to the system by restoring it.  
Furthermore, Elliot’s critique seems to only apply to a very narrow context in which restoration 
would be considered.  The situation he considers is one where there is a piece of land that has not 
already been degraded and future management could go one of two ways.  The land could be 
conserved, or it could be developed under the pretense that any degradation will be reversed by 
restoration after the fact.  It is important to note that this situation, one where restoration is a pre-
condition for development, while hypothetically possible, is not the standard context for restoration.  In 
most cases, and in the case of the Clark Fork River restoration, an example to be explored in greater 
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detail in the next chapter, degradation occurred long before restoration was a common practice.  In this 
sort of scenario, what I claim is the standard scenario for restoration, an ecosystem is impaired, often 
because of extensive pollution or as a result of development, and restoration is a reasonable (and 
perhaps the only) way to improve the situation.  Restoration is often prompted by the observation of 
ecological disrepair, as is the case with numerous superfund sites around the country.  Thus, restoration 
in these common contexts is the only course of action that can address an already existing ecological 
mess.  Conservation of a polluted, ecologically impoverished, landscape is not a reasonable or beneficial 
response in these situations.  Conservation would maintain a polluted stream in its polluted state.  Or, 
more likely, a polluted stream would never be seen as a candidate for conservation or preservation 
because of its less than pristine state.  However, it would be the most obvious candidate for restoration.      
What we can take away from Elliot’s analysis is an awareness, or humbled perspective, that the 
use of restoration is like surgery.  While preventative medicine, like conservation, is favorable when it is 
a viable option, the extent of ecological damage requires that more invasive procedures be used to 
repair an ecosystem to the highest degree we can.  And of course, the highest degree we can return a 
damaged ecosystem to will never be identical to some real or imagined pristine state.  As Andrew Light 
points out in “Ecological Restoration and the Culture of Nature,” we can think of restoration as divided 
into two forms, benevolent and malicious, and Elliot’s argument as thoroughly condemning any 
restoration that is a means of malicious deception (54).  According to Light’s distinction, it should be 
clear that any restoration that is performed in order to disguise destruction of nature ought to be 
rejected.  But for restoration that falls outside this particular malicious form, there is still much to be 
said about what good restoration is and the more subtle risks that remain.     
Eric Katz, another skeptic of restoration, considers Elliot’s first essay as a commendable starting 
point for a deeper critique of restoration.  In his essay, “The Big Lie,” Katz agrees with Elliot’s basic 
conclusion that a restored ecosystem or landscape is less valuable than the pre-degraded system that 
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came before it.  However, Katz is critical of Elliot’s comparison of art to nature, pointing out that 
paradigmatic art is taken to be a finished, static work, whereas nature is fluid, dynamic, and 
continuously evolving (237).  Katz makes three claims about restoration relating to: 1) human artifacts, 
2) a technological worldview, and 3) humanity’s domination of nature.    
His first claim is that restoration can only produce something artificial.  Katz sees the end result 
of restoration as being an artifact of human interests rather than a natural entity.  He states, “A 
‘restored’ nature is an artifact created to meet human satisfactions and interests” (232).  An artifact is 
something that is designed to have a particular structure, function, and use.  Something that is the 
product of intention is an artifact. Therefore, the human intentionality involved in restoration (the 
planning, designing, and implementation all requiring intention) makes the resulting ecosystem or 
landscape an artifact.   What, we might ask, is the real harm in creating an artifact through restoration?  
As an artifact, a restored ecosystem is not truly a piece of nature, but rather a uniquely human 
manifestation.  A view underlying Katz’s first claim is that nature and humanity are separate.  
Emphasizing this distinction, he says that, “the processes of the natural world that are free of human 
interference are the most natural” (238).  As humans intervene on and change natural entities, the 
degree to which they are natural decreases and artificiality increases.  On its own, the statement that 
humanity and nature are mutually exclusive seems to be a descriptive one.  This becomes a moral claim 
when we consider Katz’s implication.  I understand him to be moving from the descriptive claim that not 
only are humanity and nature exclusive of one another to the moral claim that we ought to stay out of 
nature to the extent that we can.  According to Katz, we have a moral responsibility to not intervene in 
nature so as to not turn things with natural value into artifacts.   
If restoration claims that it can, and that we ought to, repair natural entities, then it would seem 
to imply that whatever work is done must not erase the naturalness of the thing.  By showing that 
restoration claims to create something natural, but that it in fact creates something artificial, Katz takes 
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himself to have shown that restoration constitutes a sort of deception.  This deception, as Elliot pointed 
out as well, is carried out unnoticed through technological means that are widely, but disastrously, 
accepted as the best way to solve environmental problems.       
Katz’s second claim is that ecological restoration, and the wide acceptance that it has gained, is 
the result of a pervasive technological worldview.  “On a simple level, [restoration] is the same kind of 
‘technological fix’ that has engendered the environmental crisis.  Human science and technology will fix, 
repair, and improve natural processes” (232).  And, connecting technology to the artifacts, “I want to 
focus on the creation of artifacts, for that is what technology does” (234).  His argument implies that 
what separates humanity from nature, specifically, is our technology.   
For Katz, technology is the ultimate expression of the human intention to shape everything 
around us to our liking.  Along this same line, he sees technology as essentially anthropocentric, and 
thus every artifact that we create with it comes from this unacceptably self-absorbed motivation.  On 
the other hand, non-human, non-technological processes in the world create nature.  Natural entities, 
he claims, have no design or intended use because they are not the product of an intentional creator. 
But when we alter nature, we infuse it with our intention and design.   
In many ways we can see Katz’s critique of restoration as a broader critique of society’s faith in 
technology and its failure to value nature on its own terms.  As Katz emphatically states, “I am outraged 
by the idea that a technologically created ‘nature’ will be passed off as reality” (234).  But why exactly is 
technology, and the resulting artificiality it creates, a problem beyond the initial accusation of 
deception?  If we acknowledge that there is a part of us, something of humanity, in the product of 
restoration, then this does not appear to be deceptive.  As SER’s definition of restoration states, we are 
“assisting in the recovery” of an ecosystem, not creating a new one to replace an old broken one.   
Beyond his “visceral” response that restoration is deceptive, he explains that as a technological 
means, restoration expresses an unwarranted anthropocentrism.  Because we view the world through a 
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technological lens, we see things mechanistically.  When we view nature in this way, he argues, we see 
nature as another machine which we will design and rebuild until it fits our liking.  Designing and 
building ecosystems to create a comfortable habitat for ourselves precludes the possibility of respecting 
and truly giving back to nature what we previously took away from it.  Katz sees restoration as just one 
more way that the “unrecognized manifestation of the insidious dream of the human domination of 
nature” will be carried out, “cloaked in an environmental consciousness” (232).  And it is the pervasive 
technological perspective and means that enable us to do so.          
We now arrive at Katz’s third claim: the most fundamental wrong of restoration is its 
manifestation of the human domination of nature.  “The fundamental error is thus domination, the 
denial of freedom and autonomy” (240).  With further detail, he adds that “once we dominate nature, 
once we restore and redesign nature for our own purposes, then we have destroyed nature – we have 
created an artificial reality, in a sense, a false reality, which merely provides us the pleasant illusory 
appearance of the natural environment” (240).  By expressing only human interests through the artifact-
creating technology of restoration, we undermine nature’s self-determination.  This denial of autonomy 
constitutes domination.  But what if we design restoration in a way that attempts to promote the self-
determination of nature and not our own purposes?  Just as I can design and create a meal that will be 
to the liking of my friends, and not merely my own satisfaction, couldn’t we also restore with the 
interests of another in mind? Couldn’t we restore nature for nature’s sake?   
While these three claims, constituting the core of his argument, do state risks of restoration, 
they seem overdone.  What I mean is that if we take his argument seriously, it will not just lead to an 
indictment of restoration, but of all the practices that involve technologically mediated interactions 
between people and the natural world.  If this argument is correct, it does not seem possible for humans 
to exist without dominating nature.  But, before considering any further response to Katz, I want to 
highlight his closing statements which seem to suddenly soften his harsher conclusion. 
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The point of my argument here is that we must not misunderstand what we humans are doing 
when we attempt to restore or repair natural areas.  We are not restoring nature; we are not 
making it whole and healthy again. Nature restoration is a compromise; it should not be a basic 
policy goal.  It is a policy that makes the best of a bad situation; it cleans up our mess. We are 
putting a piece of furniture over the stain in the carpet, for it provides a better appearance.  As a 
matter of policy, however, it would be much more significant to prevent the causes of the stain 
(240). 
 
It is unacceptable to conclude that human interaction with nature is necessarily dominating, and 
that is what Katz’s argument entails.  Although he never directly states that humanity, and our current 
technology, is unavoidably dominative, his argument fails to show how his concerns are unique to 
restoration.  For Katz, restoration is a form of domination because it promotes only human goals and 
intentions through technological means and thereby excludes the possibility of nature expressing its 
autonomy.  His critique could easily be directed toward a number of other practices like agriculture, 
building shelter, and any other human activity where we technologically modify our environment to 
meet our interests.  He places this argument in the context of restoration, and wants to restrict it to this 
practice, but the conclusion is far-reaching.  If his argument correctly points out that restoration is a 
form of domination, then the argument also correctly identifies this same error in many other human 
practices.  Further, if we conclude on the basis of this argument that we ought not to participate in 
restoration, then it seems that we ought not to participate in any of those other activities which 
constitute domination of nature for the same reason.  In Katz’s defense, it is true that restoration is one 
practice that claims to actively do something good on behalf of nature.  Thus, it may be worse for 
restoration to be dominating than something like agriculture or industrial development because these 
are admittedly done for our own sake, not nature’s.  But as I mentioned before, if domination in 
restoration is contingent on it also being deceptive, and if deception can be avoided by acknowledging 
the mark of our own hand in the work of restoration, then it seems his accusation of domination falls 
short.       
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So, it makes sense that his closing statements of the essay would take on a milder tone.  But 
even here his statement of the fundamental problem with restoration seems inadequate.  I agree, and I 
think many restorationists would concur, that restoration certainly does make the best of a bad 
situation.  And yes, it does in fact clean up messes that we have made of ecological systems.  However, 
the cleaning up that restoration attempts, and often succeeds at, is not simply an aesthetic one as Katz’s 
metaphor of putting furniture over a carpet stain implies.  Removing pollution from the sediment of a 
river and its floodplain doesn’t just make it look better; it makes it better, healthier, and more functional 
for all the aquatic and terrestrial life that consume its water or pull nutrients up out of the soil and into 
their roots.  To imply otherwise is a weak attempt to hold onto a position that refuses to acknowledge 
any positive potential for restoration.  What would strengthen Katz’s argument is a statement of the 
features unique to restoration that make it likely, or at least plausibly, a form of domination.     
The fact is that restoration can, and does, go beyond an aesthetic cleanup of our unsavory 
ecological messes.  Along with the successes of restoration, there is also a history of failures.  But when 
done well, restoration has brought back ecological function to places stunted by gross impairment 
caused by extraction, development, and pollution.  However, what we can take away from Katz, a point 
that will be made clear by Colette Palamar, is that restoration can become a form of domination if 
appropriate goals and limits are not set.   
Katz does not suggest how we can avoid domination, other than the suggestion that we should 
feel guilt rather than optimism about having to restore nature.  More practical guidance is needed and 
feasible alternatives formulated to address the real concern of unchecked domination.   
In the end Katz is certainly pointing to a relevant concern, but we need to know more about why 
and how restoration is a form of domination.  Furthermore, we need to investigate the role that 
technology, and a technological worldview, play in accepting the domination of nature.  There is also the 
deeper question here for environmental ethics of how any human action can avoid being an act of 
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domination.  Obviously, if every interaction we have with nature can somehow be construed as 
domination, then the category of domination is no longer a useful or insightful one.  We should be wary 
of claims that say we are providing a net benefit for the environment through restoration, or thinking of 
it as a generous gift.  At the same time we must be able to carve out a role for humanity in nature which 
is not necessarily harmful.  The question relevant here is whether or not restoration can be that 
practice.     
For Katz and for Colette Palamar, as we will see in the next section, the most important concern 
associated with restoration is human domination of nature.  However, Katz only succeeds in showing 
that the perspective and values of humanity will be present in restoration.  The expression of human 
intention and values in the design of restoration is supposed to inevitably remove the possibility for 
autonomy and self-determination of nature, thus constituting domination.  While this statement may be 
true to some extent, it is too vague to suggest how such domination actually happens and how it can be 
avoided.  So, it seems a much more specific account of exactly how restoration becomes an instance of 
domination is required.        
In “Restorashyn: Ecofeminist Restoration,” Palamar provides a critique of, and 
recommendations for improving, restoration.  Her critique is centered on the different ways that 
restoration perpetuates a pattern of human domination of nature.  The definition of domination that 
she cites is “the exhibition of or tendency toward excessive control or command over others” (287, 
footnote 11).  Comparing this definition with Katz’s critique, we need to know what counts as excessive 
control and what sorts of ways we can interact with nature, particularly through restoration, that exhibit 
control but not excessively.  “The notion of domination is one of the central and least explored 
philosophical aspects of ecological restoration. Domination typically passes unnoticed because the end 
of the restored ecosystem is simply assumed to justify the means of restoration” (287).  This statement 
shows that an assessment of restoration must look at both the process (the means) and the product (the 
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end) of restoration.  Eric Higgs addresses the difference between process and product based 
perspectives of restoration and will be discussed in more depth in the next section.  The authors 
considered so far have mostly focused on how the goals and end result of restoration are morally 
questionable.  Palamar states that the methods of restoration, which typically involve killing off various 
unwanted species or forcing the landscape to fit unrealistic historical ideals, constitute domination.  
Here we see that there are two distinct conceptual ways to understand restoration as domination; one 
relating to a disconnect between our goals for ecosystems versus their own autonomous path, and two, 
the means that we employ to bring about our goals.  An aspect of her critique that I find admirable is 
that she does not see perfection as the goal, but rather we should try to “alleviate some of the more 
overt instances of domination present in ecological restoration” (292).  It seems that there might always 
be a way, as Katz showed, to conceive of human intervention in nature as domination.  But, 
pragmatically, to begin by avoiding the worst instances of domination is a worthy goal.     
Early efforts in ecological restoration were often guided by the goal of recreating a particular 
historical state of an ecosystem.  Although this thinking is now being reformulated in light of the 
uncertainty brought on by climate change and other large-scale environmental degradation, history is 
still used to guide restoration practices.  Reference sites, which are ecosystems similar to the one being 
restored but that haven’t been damaged, are used as a blueprint for restoration.  What the unrestored 
ecosystem lacks, restorationists will attempt to replace.  Based on this standard that Palamar describes 
for setting restoration goals, she points out that implementing narrowly conceived ideals often requires 
“exclusory activities [that] echo patterns of domination and degradation that led to a need for 
restoration in the first place” (285).  According to Palamar, the guiding ideals of restoration often 
exclude elements of the past that we overlook or do not value.  Further, in the pursuit of re-creating an 
ecosystem to fit nostalgic desires, species currently living in an area are eradicated in favor of those that 
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we wish to replace them with.  Activities like removing nonnative species only because they are 
nonnative constitute domination of nature from Palamar’s ecofeminist point of view.4  
Such domination, according to Karen Warren’s ecofeminist philosophy, is the result of dualistic 
thinking.  In “The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism” Warren shows how dualistic thinking 
justifies a “logic of domination” (128).  For example, viewing the world dualistically, where humans and 
nature are separate, leads to the hierarchical thinking that humans are morally above nature.  On the 
basis of human superiority over nature, the logic that we can shape nature to our liking is justified.  
Warren’s ecofeminist theory responds to this concern of domination by laying out eight boundary 
conditions5 that are intended to make us both aware of dualistic, hierarchical thinking that has been 
used to justify domination and to provide guidance for acting in a way that is not dominant.  Following 
Warren’s response to the logic of domination, Palamar describes how applying four of Warren’s 
boundary conditions to restoration will prevent restoration from being “restorative domination.”  The 
conditions that Palamar selects are: inclusivism, pluralism, questioning objectivity, and theory in 
process.  Palamar describes how these four boundary conditions can be applied to restoration, and thus 
help practices avoid restorative domination.  She also speaks to the dualistic thinking specific to 
restoration, primarily the dichotomy between restored and degraded.     
In order to explain how each condition could be incorporated into restoration, Palamar focuses 
on the example of how restoration projects view issues related to species composition.  Species 
composition is not the only or the most important issue in restoration, but it is a straightforward 
                                                          
4     While Palamar’s critique of restoration’s goals informed by history may have once been an accurate critique, 
restoration has largely moved away from this mode of management.  Now, adaptive management practices much 
less tied to species lists and static points in history guide a great deal of restoration activities.  Ecological integrity 
and resilience are two of the preferred goals that now guide restoration.  My account here is limited to Palamar’s 
understanding of restoration and not my own.        
5     Warren explains her eight boundary conditions in both her article, “The Power and Promise of Ecological 
Feminism” and her book, Ecofeminist Philosophy.  
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example.  There are many more aspects of restoration that these conditions are applicable to, including 
ways they would serve other ecological and cultural goals.   
It will be helpful to briefly go over how the four boundary conditions that Palamar picks out are 
applied to issues of species composition in restoration.  Inclusivism means including as many viewpoints 
in a decision as possible.  In the context of restoration, one way inclusivity could play out is by including 
as many species as possible in a project.  This would not just mean bringing other species into an area 
from which they had been extirpated, but also allowing species, like non-native, non-invasive species, to 
remain at a restoration site.     
Pluralism serves as a check on inclusivism to ensure that no single species (or species interests), 
among the variety included, become dominant.  In theory, it would be possible that many species be 
included in a project, or allowed to stay, but that the project still was designed around a single species.  
For example, a stream could be restored in a way that was inclusive of all fish species but still greatly 
favored an iconic native trout.  Pluralism would encourage restorationists to give a voice, metaphorically 
speaking, to the generally underrepresented species that inhabited the stream as well.  Just because the 
condition of inclusivism is met, including as many species as possible in the project does not guarantee 
that each will be given the same priority or representation.  Think of creating an ideal society where no 
minority groups are excluded.  This would meet the condition of inclusivism.  But more than being 
included, minorities groups ought to have fair representation as well.  This is how I interpret Palamar’s 
application of pluralism to restoration.   
The need for a balance in inclusivism and pluralism can be seen in the single species approach of 
endangered species conservation.  Very often the cute and fuzzy creatures take main stage because of 
our fondness for them.  But perpetuating this sort of view of nature seems to come too close to Katz’s 
concern that we merely see nature for what we want from it.  Perhaps by representing the less desired 
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but ecologically significant species in a restoration project we can counteract an excessively 
anthropocentric view of nature.  
Questioning objectivity pushes back against the supremacy of the scientific and historical 
grounding of restoration.  From a rationalist perspective it is assumed that science and history represent 
the most comprehensive account of the facts.  An ecofeminist perspective, and other perspectives, point 
out that science can be biased and that supposedly objective fields can present quite selective accounts.  
There is no doubt that a scientific understanding of ecosystems is needed to perform good restoration, 
and that history can inform our understanding of how ecosystems change over time.  But an ecofeminist 
perspective is one way to understand that we cannot rely on science and history to make all of the 
decisions that restoration requires.  Acknowledging this helps to accept that our ecological 
understanding is based on many assumptions, some of which may need to be rejected.  For example, 
there is not a single view of ecosystems which is best for all ecological studies, different perspectives are 
needed depending on the questions being asked.6  This condition should not be taken to promote a 
purely subjective basis for restoration.  Rather, an intersubjective account, based on the diverse 
viewpoints considered, helps to identify the values, perspectives, and limitations that are derived from 
the particularities of each restoration project.     
Theory in process encourages humility in restoration because our practices should reflect our 
incomplete, ever-changing knowledge of nature.  This condition is simply the acceptance that theories 
and understanding that we act on today, might tomorrow change.  And when this happens, we will 
accept this and not stubbornly hang onto the way things have been done before.  Examples from 
restoration, especially the list of failed projects, serve as a reminder that although this practice may be 
                                                          
6     See Warren’s discussion of hierarchy theory in ecology, chapter seven of Ecofeminist Philosophy. This subject is 
also discussed in greater detail in chapter three of this thesis.  
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informed by science, it is not infallible, and it will inevitably need to be continually updated.  Embracing 
new information as it comes along more readily will speed the improvement of the practice.      
It might sound strange on first glance to think that it is problematic to think of a restored 
ecosystem as superior to a degraded one.  The problem, according to Palamar, is not that we make a 
distinction between the two states, but that this distinction is put into a value hierarchy where degraded 
systems lack value.  We should not want this dualistic view to frame our approach to restoration.  If our 
approach is to transform a system from degraded to restored, the focus is again on the end result and 
not the process.  Instead, Palamar suggests that the motivation for restoration be framed as 
participating in a process in a way that views nature as an entity that is active.  A view where humans 
are acting on the object of nature through restoration should be replaced with the view that restoration 
is a process of integrating human and natural activities.   
In Palamar’s view, the main goal of restoration would be to remove obstacles like pollution, 
erosion, or industrial development, and leave much of the work of restoration up to ecological 
processes free of purely human goals.  “We would no longer see ecological restoration as the 
restoration of a degraded system but rather as a process by which we set up conditions that open the 
scope of possibilities for the land” (294).  Higgs makes a similar emphasis but also argues that there 
should be more space for cultural values to be expressed through restoration.  Also, Palamar’s approach 
here addresses Katz’s concern of domination in which restoration left no room for the self-
determination of nature.  This suggests a clear way for human participation to coexist with the self-
realization of natural entities.  Our role in restoration in not recreation, producing a replacement 
ecosystem, but the alleviation of the obstacles preventing autonomy of nature.   
Unlike the early critiques from Elliot and Katz, which cast restoration as an essentially bad 
practice, Palamar sees a way for restoration as it is currently practiced to be improved.  Her inclusive 
conception of restoration takes up Katz’s concern of domination, which cited our failure to grant 
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autonomy or self-determination to nature due to our overly designed and technologically implemented 
means.  It seems that the intention involved in designing a way to “open the scope of possibility for the 
land” would hardly result in an artifact, at least not of the sort that is of most concern to Katz.  The goal 
of restoration design being the ability of nature to take its course, whatever that might be, provides a 
response to Katz’s statement that all design is necessarily aimed at satisfying purely anthropocentric 
interests and desires.   
However, I find it somewhat unsatisfying that any specificity we might want for a restoration, 
beyond improving the possibility of self-determination for nature, is taken away.  Merely removing 
impediments for natural entities to pursue their teleologically directed ends7 removes some of the more 
culturally centered engagement with nature that many people desire.  I wonder if it is possible to retain 
more precise, complexly designed, projects while still avoiding domination.  Can we participate in the 
creation of something that is both to our liking and to the benefit of autonomous natural systems?  Is 
there a way to justify prioritizing some aspects of restoration through cultural traditions and values?  
And lastly, does Palamar’s notion of restoration require the sort of impartiality that ecofeminists 
explicitly resist? I will return to the questions I raise here in chapter three.   
Palamar brings a fresh approach to the restoration debate with the inclusion of an ecofeminist 
perspective.  Yet, her focus on domination and examples of species composition touch on a narrow band 
of the full spectrum of issues that an ecofeminist or care ethics perspective is relevant to.8  Her analysis 
of dualisms and the logic of domination in restoration is helpful in further developing Katz’s concern of 
domination, but more work is needed here to add detail on how to respond to these potential errors of 
                                                          
7     See Paul Taylor’s Respect for nature: A theory of environmental ethics. Taylor describes all life as “teleological 
centers of life” and from this feature explains an environmental ethics which prioritizes the respect for such 
centers of life.   
8     It should be noted that while ecofeminism and care ethics applied to environmental issues are distinct, there is 
substantial overlap, and can therefore be referred to collectively at times.  The similarities and differences of 
ecofeminism and care ethics in the context of environmental issues will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
three.   
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restoration.  For these reasons, I want to consider her work as a jumping off point in my third chapter 
where I will apply feminist theory, specifically care ethics, to issues faced by the theory and practice of 
restoration.  In the third chapter I argue that care ethics can also show how we can avoid restorative 
domination, but that it goes beyond this negative responsibility as well.  The relational basis of care 
ethics shows how we can express a reflective partiality for certain features of ecosystems through 
restorative practices and thereby fulfill our positive responsibility to care for the natural world as well as 
satisfy our human aptitudes.   
One of the most optimistic perspectives in the restoration literature comes from William Jordan.  
In his essay, “Sunflower Forest” and a book of the same title, he focuses on how we can restore nature 
and the human-nature relationship.  Jordan’s view of restoration is significantly shaped by his 
involvement in the prairie restoration project at the University of Wisconsin – Madison.  For example, 
the goals for restoration that he specifies include replicating a species list and might be possible with the 
restoration of the tall grass prairie.  Before this prairie restoration began, almost none of the species 
that historically comprised the tall grass prairie were present.  The project has been deemed an ongoing 
success by many because of how the landscape has been transformed to a state similar to what it was 
before it was initially developed.  What I appreciate most about Jordan’s work is his rigorous attention 
to ways that we can build a positive relationship with nature through restoration.  Jordan’s emphasis on 
relationship, and the role that restoration plays in the human-nature relationship, is one reason that I 
first thought of care ethics as a favorable ethical theory to ground restoration.   
In his essay he lists six “essential elements” of a healthy human-nature relationship and then 
explains how restoration can satisfy each of them (19-20).  I won’t go into detail about all of them, but 
will highlight those that will be relevant to what Higgs has to say and to analysis in chapter three.  The 
core of his argument is that we need to create a positive role for culture within in nature.  For Jordan, 
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human culture’s role in in nature will only be positive and sustaining if it embeds participation with 
natural systems in ritualized traditions. 
Jordan frames the goal of the environmental movement by stating “The real challenge to 
environmentalism is not to preserve nature by protecting it from human beings or rescuing it from their 
influence, but to provide the basis for a healthy relationship between culture and nature” (21).  Many 
authors have maintained the human-nature dualism on the empirical grounds that it is an accurate 
description of the pattern of human involvement in nature.  Jordan acknowledges this regrettable trend, 
but refuses to see this dichotomy as essential.  Instead, Jordan pushes back against the notion that a 
hands off approach, embodied by a preservationist perspective in environmentalism, can actually save 
and maintain the goods that we wish to protect.  He argues that such an attenuated relationship leaves 
no option but for people to be consumers of the natural world.  If participation and hands on 
engagement are not allowed, then all we can do is consume from a distance.  Positive participation, on 
the other hand satisfies the innate desire to engage in our natural abilities.  He identifies hunting, 
gathering, and cultivating as some of the human aptitudes that we ought to engage in.  While these are 
all consumptive to a degree, they also include means to give back, or reciprocate in our relationship with 
nature, in a way that preservationist bystander activities do not.  Further, hunting, gathering, and 
cultivating enrich and deepen one’s connection to place and engagement with ecosystem processes.  
Restoration can satisfy the need for active participation by giving people the opportunity to engage in 
the land community, to again be members of it, by cultivating not only for their own purposes but also 
for the purpose of enhancing the ecosystem.  As Jordan compares preservation and restoration, he says, 
“Limiting use is one way to address this problem, but it is only a stop gap measure that does nothing 
either to satisfy the human hunger for immersion in nature or to deal with the unavoidable problem of 
ecosystem drift in response to human influence, however subtle” (22).   
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Restoration cannot stand alone as one practice among many if it is to be the new paradigm for 
environmentalism.  An additional component to this theory is the need to embed these practices in 
ritual and tradition.  Jordan believes that rituals play an important role in “mediating relationships.”  
While the widespread acceptance and praise for science and technology has widened the gap between 
humanity and nature, he says, ritual may be the only way to bring the two back together.  Integration of 
people in nature, and the ritual that allows this to happen is vital for the success of restoration.  Without 
it, there will be a disconnect that will inhibit our ability to see ourselves as a community member and 
restrict our interactions with the land to those of conflict mediation.      
Eric Higgs is hesitant to say that restoration should be a religion of sorts, but also heavily 
emphasizes the integration of culture and nature through restoration.  We need the ecological goods 
that restoration brings back, but also we need restoration itself to nurture our various storied traditions 
with the land.  Connection to place through focal restoration and community involvement will help to 
restore nature and prevent future degradation.  Higgs doesn’t shy away from restoration leaving a 
distinctly human mark on nature and agrees with Jordan that this is inevitable and not necessarily a bad 
thing.  But he distinguishes between focal and technological restoration, as well as the requirements of 
historical fidelity and ecological integrity, to show what the favorable forms of human intentionality 
would look like.    
 While Katz and Elliot only cite industrial scale restoration, and nothing of local, community 
based practices, Eric Higgs gives a more comprehensive and inclusive account of the good and bad forms 
of restoration.  In Nature by Design Higgs digs deeper into Andrew Light’s distinction between malicious 
and benevolent restoration.  The question Higgs wants to answer: what are the necessary conditions for 
good ecological restoration?  His answer sets out four keystone concepts: ecological integrity, historical 
fidelity, focal restoration, and wild design.  Each of these four keystone concepts represents a risk that 
must be avoided and a benefit that we should strive to realize.   
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 Ecological integrity conveys a scientific adherence to creating (or re-creating) a functional 
natural system.  Concepts like structure, function, and composition are considered when determining 
how to recover whatever damage has been done to a biotic community.  The risk in ignoring ecological 
integrity is that we will simply engineer a system to our liking, deriving whatever function is useful only 
for our own purposes and not those of the nonhuman inhabitants.  More and more restoration is driven 
by scientific understanding of how whole systems of life are connected and flourish. But Higgs, as well as 
others understand that a reductionist account of ecosystems that a scientific perspective provides is not 
all that we need to consider when designing and implementing a restoration project. The value that is 
communicated by putting ecological integrity first is Higgs’ prioritization of the ecosystem over our own 
interests.  To paraphrase, if we do not put the ecosystem first, we can hardly call it ecological 
restoration.    
 Historical fidelity is one of the more controversial aspects of Higgs’ notion of good restoration.  
What or whose history are we supposed to be faithful too? And why?  In many ways historical fidelity is 
closely tied to ecological integrity.  We seek information from the past about what species were present 
in an area, and what allowed a system to function before it was impaired.  Ecological history can inform 
us about change and variability, serving as a reminder that ecosystems are not static entities, but always 
changing and adapting to variations in the environment.  There are also dangers associated with 
historical fidelity, mainly the human tendency toward nostalgia.   We all have a way of thinking of the 
past, laden with our psychological, emotional, and personal biases.  Nostalgia can obscure ecological, 
cultural, and historical realities that ought to play into the performance of restoration.    
 Focal restoration borrows from Albert Borgmann’s theory of focal things and practices and is 
discussed as an antidote to technological restoration.  In an age dominated by technologically mediated 
experience, intense consumerism, and a generally distracted existence, focal things and practices are 
ways to focus on those aspects of life that bring meaning and richness to our lives.  Higgs believes that 
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restoration is something that can gather people and communities around an engaging practice.  Not 
only can we restore nature, but we can also restore our relationship with nature.  Here Higgs places a lot 
of weight on restoration being performed best by a community living in the region of the restoration 
project.  He is motivated by a developing trend toward the professionalization of restoration.  The worry 
is that restoration will be used to “naturalize” the presence of corporations in nature.  Similar to the 
original concern of Elliot, Higgs also sees that potential for restoration to be misused, and used 
deceptively, to cover up the destructive nature of industrial activity.  Professionalization would also 
exclude community involvement, and instead of being driven by local knowledge of place, the end 
product, financial efficiency, and high tech solutions would be the standard.  The end result, again 
drawing from Borgmann, might be the commodification of nature and restoration itself.  The moral 
aspects of commodification show us that drawing things like nature and restoration out of their contexts 
and into the market removes values from them that are not readily quantified by monetary terms.     
 The last of the four keystone concepts is wild design.  This notion wrestles with the difficulty of 
balancing human interests with what is in the interest of nonhuman, natural entities.  One problem is 
that we do not have privileged access to what truly is in the interest of an ecosystem, or if such a thing 
even exists outside of our perspective projected onto nature.  Ecological sciences can tell us some of 
what an ecosystem requires.  But this area of science is known for its lack of predictive power.  When 
assessing the interests of natural entities, descriptive sciences can tell us what makes some systems 
work but we cannot very easily draw precise, normative prescriptions from them.  Knowing how an 
ecosystem functions, what species interact with which others, the basic elements that organisms 
depend on, and so on, does not necessarily tell us what is in their interest.  Compounding the difficulty 
of understanding what is in the interest of ecosystems is the conflict between ecological flourishing and 
what many in our culture consider to be human flourishing.  Many of the luxuries or even necessities 
that are taken for granted require the exploitation of natural resources and are antithetical to ecological 
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flourishing. Human interests do often conflict with even the broadest interests of ecosystems.  As a 
simple example, most people enjoy having roads to travel on but paved roads with constant waves of 
traffic are categorically bad for ecological health on a number of levels.      
Higgs’ combination of wild and design seems paradoxical, but is of course intentional.  The 
conjunction of the two words draws attention to the need to combine or reintegrate culture and nature, 
human intentions with autonomous ecological processes.  By considering the ethical primacy of 
ecosystem interests in restoration along with the inevitability of human intention in design and 
implementation, Higgs hopes that interests of both parties will be seen as shared interests to a great 
degree.  If they can be shown to be shared interests, then restoration won’t represent a choice between 
humans or nature, but promotion of a combined flourishing.    
In the next chapter I will show that these problems do not only exist in the realm of the 
academic philosopher, as theoretical problems only, but are real dilemmas for those who practice 
restoration as volunteers and professionals. Grounding the conceptual issues of restoration in examples 
from the Clark Fork River restoration, clarity about what is really at stake is gained.  I will build on the 
first and second chapter in chapter three the following points.  First, restoration philosophy lacks a 
unifying moral framework and I will suggest that care ethics is a favorable theory to turn to for this role.  
Second, Katz is right to worry about domination in restoration but his view of ecosystem autonomy is 
too restrictive of human intervention. Third, Higgs’ concept of wild design, in conjunction with the 
requirements of care motivate us to ask if and how something such as an ecosystem can be cared for.  
The fourth and last point is that Palamar’s notion of restorative domination and goal for restoration that 
avoids domination, again, along with the requirements of care, lead me to wonder if we must accept 
impartiality in order to perform good restoration, or if care ethics might show a way to guide and justify 
the partiality that we might have toward particular species or other aspects of an ecosystem.      
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2. Clark Fork Restoration: Grounding Theory in Practice  
 My goal for this chapter is to connect the conceptual issues identified in chapter one with the 
difficult decisions faced by restorationists on the ground.  I want to show how the theoretical concerns 
from the literature review in the previous chapter are instantiated in actual restoration projects.  The 
restoration of the Clark Fork River, a large scale watershed restoration project in Western Montana, will 
serve as my primary example.     
Between Butte and Warm Springs, Montana, several creeks come together to form the 
headwaters of the Clark Fork River.  The river runs west from here through Montana, winding its way to 
the Idaho panhandle where it drains into Lake Pend Oreille.  In its course, it drains just over 25,000 
square miles of the western Rocky Mountains between the Continental Divide and the Bitterroot Range.  
It is an iconic river, known for its abundance of wildlife, recreation, and as the historical territory of the 
Salish people (now referred to as the Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes) prior to the 1855 
Hellgate Treaty.  The Clark Fork drainage is important habitat for many native species like the Bull Trout 
and Westslope Cutthroat Trout, as well as the lifeblood of agriculture in the area.   
Starting in the 1800’s and continuing through current times, sites along the Clark Fork (and 
Silver Bow Creek, one of the main tributaries comprising the Clark Fork’s headwaters) have also been 
areas of intensive resource extraction, particularly the mining and smelting of copper ore.  The Berkeley 
Pit in Butte Montana is the largest of the many mining sites in the area.  Mine tailings from this and 
other mines are the source of the majority of the pollution in the Clark Fork watershed.  About 120 miles 
downstream from its inception, the Clark Fork reaches the former site of the Milltown Dam, in Milltown, 
Montana.  In 1908 a 100 year flooding event washed millions of cubic yards of sediment laced with toxic 
mine tailings downstream that piled up at the head of the Milltown Dam.  In the decades following this 
flood, heavy metals and other toxins like arsenic leached out of the tailings, contaminating the well 
water used by residents in Milltown, and leaving ecological dead zones, known as “slickens” from Silver 
Congdon   31 
Bow Creek all the way down to Milltown.  Human health effects, such as cancer rates and birth defects, 
and ecological effects like fish kills and hundreds of acres where vegetation never regrew, drew 
mounting concern over the decades.  In 1981 when routine water quality checks on wells in Milltown, 
Montana showed this contamination, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began investigating.  
Eventually, in 1983, the EPA added this stretch of the river, named the Clark Fork/Milltown Dam site, to 
the National Priorities List (NPL) for superfund cleanup.  To this day, it remains the largest superfund site 
in the western United States.   
In 2008, a settlement was reached that required The Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) to pay 
$123 million for the cleanup of the Clark Fork/Milltown Dam superfund site.  The cleanup of the river 
has been comprised of several projects overseen by the EPA, Montana Department of Environmental 
Quality (DEQ), and other groups such as the Clark Fork Coalition.  Much work has already been 
completed, including the removal of the Milltown Dam and sediment, restoration of sections of Silver 
Bow Creek and the Upper Clark Fork River, and the creation of what can be called a “restoration 
ranching” operation at The Dry Cottonwood Creek Ranch in the Deer Lodge valley.  In this chapter I will 
focus primarily on these three aspects of the restoration project, though there are certainly more that 
could be discussed.  
The first conceptual issue related to domination that I will consider here pertains to the ideals 
that guide restoration.  Potentially, the problem is that the goals we set might not represent what is in 
the interest of the ecological entities.  For example, being “true to history,” might turn out to be better 
described as forcing the landscape to fit the selective memories or desires that people have for the area.  
Palamar was particularly worried about the removal and exclusion of non-native, non-invasive species.  
Removing or otherwise excluding non-native, non-invasive species seems like unwarranted domination 
of nature to her because it shows excessive and unnecessary control over species composition, rather 
than an opening of possibility for the ecosystem to develop as species come and go.  Eric Higgs’ notion 
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of wild design is related to Palamar’s concern because it explores how we can find a balance between 
the inevitable mark of human intentionality in restoration with a respectful representation of the 
autonomous voice of ecosystems.     
Both Palamar and Higgs noted the potential for historical fidelity to play a role in the domination 
of nature.  If restoration projects are designed on the basis of what Palamar argues are arbitrary and 
unrealistic historical ideals (returning ecosystem composition to an arbitrary, static point in history), or 
what Higgs says is an expression of unchecked nostalgia (creating nature to reflect an impression of 
wilderness or nature that does not correlate to ecological realities), then it seems restoration will force 
the land to fit a mold that only promotes our interests.  This is basically Katz’s concern about domination 
as well.  Although he takes a more pessimistic view, Katz is concerned that restoration will promote only 
human interests and exclude the possibility of self-determination for nature.  Higgs offers a solution to 
this unique problem of design for restoration.  When articulating the keystone concept of ecological 
integrity, he states that ecological values and interests must be the primary value guiding restoration.  
Ecological, not human, values must come first.  Furthermore, Higgs’s explanation of his fourth keystone 
concept, wild design, acknowledges the challenge of simultaneously representing what is in the interest 
of humans and the ecosystem. Here he says we need to listen to the quiet but persistent, voice of 
ecosystems which is all too easily drowned out by our own voice, but ought to have priority.   
The question to ask in this chapter is how the design and implementation of the Clark Fork 
restoration has been informed by history and other sources of information.  And, do these sources of 
information, as the basis for restoration design, promote purely human interests as Higgs, Palamar and 
Katz worry?  Or does it meet Palamar’s vision for restoration as simply opening the scope of possibilities 
for the land and Higgs’s ideal of wild design?  
Two project goals for restoration of the Clark Fork River and Silver Bow Creek, from the 
headwaters down to the Milltown Dam, are to remove sediment in areas that have particularly high 
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levels of contamination and to lower the elevation of the flood plain.  Achieving these goals requires 
designers to draw on many sources of information, including facts about the current state of the 
watershed, general ecological and hydrological understanding, the historical states of the river and the 
organisms that inhabit the area, and an estimation of future circumstances that the restorative process 
must anticipate.   
The landscape might be dominated (in the broad sense that Katz implies) in an overt (but 
plausibly justified) way through the use of heavy equipment to remove and haul out the sediment, to 
bring in new, clean fill, and to reconstruct the banks of the river.  These more general forms of 
domination, those forms related to exerting our control of nature through technology that are not 
unique to restoration, will be left to the next section.  In this section the focus is on the more subtle 
issue of how the implementation of the physically intrusive work is justified and if it can be called 
“domination” at all.    
Historical records, meaning records that indicate the state of the river prior to mining activity 
and the massive flood in 1908, are used to understand the sinuosity of the river before mining and other 
activities channelized and redirected portions of it.  The same records are also used to determine areas 
where the flood plain has become elevated over time, and should now be lowered to create a river 
drainage that will be more resilient to future flooding events.  Based on these records and current-day 
constraints in the area (like bridges, railroad tracks, and other structures that won’t be removed) areas 
of sediment have been removed, riverbanks rebuilt and revegetated, and flood plains lowered and 
structured to respond better to flooding events.   
Palamar discusses the relation of historical ideals to domination by arguing that the time periods 
that restorationists want to return an ecosystem to are chosen arbitrarily.  She describes how the time 
period right before European settlement, about 500 years ago, is often the time period which 
ecosystems are restored to, but that this choice reflects a purely human vision for the landscape, and 
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not an ecological one.  She asks, why not choose a time period “5,000 or even 50,000 years ago instead 
of 500 years ago” (288).  The choice of this time period as the preferred state of an ecosystem then 
justifies removing all the species that didn’t exist back then.  And the act of removing species to meet a 
human, not ecological, vision of an ecosystem constitutes restorative domination.  But the time period 
chosen in the Clark Fork project doesn’t seem to warrant the same accusation.  There is a very specific 
event that changed the river basin in concrete ways, namely the history of mining in the area and the 
1908 flood that washed mine tailings downstream, that justify this design.  All history is doing in this 
case is identifying the point at which pollution was introduced and the river was chemically, structurally, 
and ecologically changed for the worse, for humans and non-humans alike.  The restoration efforts 
simply seek to reverse this.  There is no species list from long ago that will be recreated, requiring the 
destruction of the current system for no good reason.      
Perhaps a case similar to the native vs. non-native one that Palamar makes could be made based 
on a polluted vs. non-polluted dichotomy.  In this case, Palamar suggests that the native vs. non-native 
distinction, where native is equated with good, and non-native with bad, results in domination because 
it is used to justify the removal of all non-native species, even if they are not invasive, or have even 
become naturalized after being in the area for hundreds of years.  In the Clark Fork restoration, plants, 
and anything else in sediments they grow out of, which are highly contaminated, are killed and removed 
as part of the restoration process.  Taken out of context, this destructive part of restoration might be 
seen as domination.  But in the context of the Clark Fork restoration, it would be shortsighted to call this 
a form of unwarranted, anthropocentric domination.  The pollution, mainly the lead, arsenic, and 
cadmium, are most detrimental to human health, and the copper and zinc are most detrimental to the 
plant life.  All these toxins are mixed together in the soil such that removal of the sediment on its own 
cannot be seen as favoring humans or nonhuman ecological entities.  Restoration in this case is a 
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combined effort done for the good of ecological and human interests because they are inherently 
intertwined, not separate endeavors.   
Future ecological communities (the plants and animals that will inhabit the area after 
restoration) will benefit from the unpolluted environment, not the current organisms being destroyed in 
the process of restoration.  Even so, the sort of domination that Palamar is talking about still does not 
seem to apply here.  One of the reasons why is because this seems exactly like the sort of work that 
must be done in restoration to open the scope of possibilities for the land and its future self-
determination.  We can see here that even this domination-avoiding notion of restoration will require 
some violence and destruction.  The real difficulty here seems to be determining how we should 
understand and justify the unfortunate necessity of destruction in restoration.       
In terms of the selection of plant species used for revegetation in the Clark Fork, all of the 
information I could find suggested that plants common to the area were used for vegetation, meaning 
that the same composition is represented in the pre- and post-restoration states.  In terms of the 
recovery of animal species, the project’s approach has been to set up the conditions for fish in healthier 
sections of the river to naturally repopulate the formerly fishless zones once restoration has been 
completed.  The return of Westslope Cutthroat has already been documented in stretches of Silver Bow 
Creek that have not seen fish for decades.  So this also does not appear to be the sort of action that the 
authors fear may amount to domination.   
One aspect related to how history informs restoration that might be linked to domination is the 
incorporation of agricultural needs into the project.  The Clark Fork Coalition’s three part strategy is to 
“Rewater, Reconnect, and Restore” the Clark Fork River and its tributaries (Clark Fork Coalition: Healing 
Streams).  Part of this involves negotiating with the agricultural community on how much water can be 
diverted.  A strict adherent to historical ideals might say that all river diversions should be cut off for this 
to be true restoration.  In this sense historical ideals might actually better serve the ecological integrity 
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of the restoration project.  However, the Clark Fork Coalition has been able to negotiate for reduced 
diversion and has brought water back to tributaries allowing native cutthroat and other species to 
return to the area.  This is an improvement over the state of things had these areas not been restored, 
even if a perfect ideal was not met.  The sense in which this might amount to domination is that human 
values are imposed on the landscape by continuing to divert any water for agriculture.  This agriculture 
is not of ecological value, and if these practices were abandoned, then native composition, or at least 
somewhat wild composition of things would return.  But the fact that restoration represents an 
improvement over the pre-restoration state should be the emphasis here. 9    
Ecological integrity, a keystone concept for Higgs based on an understanding of ecological 
sciences, is very important for the restoration of the Clark Fork River.  From a scientific perspective, 
pollution should be removed because it impairs, and in many places altogether prevents, ecological 
function.  Fishless stretches of the river and its tributaries, and the dead zones along the bank know as 
slickens are two examples in the case of the Clark Fork River.  Restoration of the Clark Fork has 
promoted recreation, or rather the presence of recreationally valued species, as a prominent reason to 
restore.10  A native trout, the Westslope Cutthroat, is one of the prized species for anglers in this area.  
Western Montana is famous for its fly-fishing and this is an important aspect of the economy for many 
small towns in the Clark Fork drainage. However, an overemphasis on returning ecological integrity for 
the purpose of recreationally prized fisheries is one case where restoration on the Clark Fork may over-
emphasize a human value.  Even if this is the case, it stands to reason that restoration done to promote 
a fishery can still be to the overall ecological benefit of the place.  The ecological concept of keystone 
                                                          
9     I will talk more about this topic in the next chapter, but I will say briefly that care ethics helps to make sense of 
the goal of improvement of ecosystems, rather than the perfectionism implied by reconstructing an ecosystem to 
fit a pre-European pristine state.  However, as mentioned previously, idealized pristine states of the past have lost 
the importance in today’s restoration versus restoration in previous decades.   
10     The Clark Fork Coalition draws support from fly-fisherman and emphasizes how restoration is a good thing for 
sportsman because it will improve populations of Westslope Cutthroat trout.   
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species, which Westslope Cutthroat are considered to be for their aquatic environment, justifies a 
project that promotes their flourishing because it will have a sort of ecological trickle- down effect on 
the other organisms that make up the food web and ecosystem.  Nonetheless, it could be that more 
representation should be given to the organisms that we haven’t heard as much about, perhaps some 
amphibian species, a group of animals that is known to be particularly sensitive to pollution and climate 
change.  Without a specific example though it is unfair to judge the project on this basis.    
Coming to Higgs’s concept of wild design, we meet the difficulty of simultaneously promoting 
human and ecological interests head on.  To recap the notion of wild design, the term itself gets at what 
some have seen as the paradox of restoration, especially in areas considered to be wild.  To many 
people, wildness is equated with areas of nature where people have had no effect, meaning that such 
places could not be wild if they were designed by people.  Yet restoration has often been seen as the 
attempt to design nature, including designing wild places.  Higgs wants to confront the dualism between 
people and nature with the concept of wild design.  He wants to convey the possibility that natural 
places, even wild places, can speak through people in a way that allows us to represent the interests of 
natural entities.  Higgs goes as far as to speak of “restoration as conversation” saying that we engage 
with the natural world, work with it, in order to become attuned to its more specific interests, desires, 
and requirements (286).  I will pick up with the difficulties contained in the notion of wild design more in 
the next chapter, but for the purposes here, suffice it to say that wild design acknowledges that human 
intentionality and ecological interests are not mutually exclusive, but rather, two value sets that at times 
conflict, and at other times, share a common ground.   
It seems that the condition of wild design is more easily met in cases like the Clark Fork 
restoration where restoration involves removing pollution from the environment which is detrimental to 
all.  The most obvious damage to the Clark Fork watershed, that is, the heavy metal laden sediment in 
the river, banks, and floodplain, is damaging to the human and nonhuman inhabitants alike.  When 
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there is a common ground like this, we can see how restoration can be an effort toward a combined 
flourishing rather than a resolution between two parties with opposing interests.  We truly can design a 
restoration project where, at least in one aspect of it, human interests also directly serve ecological 
interests.      
Three other concerns that I will now consider are artifactuality, misuse, and deception.  In one 
way or another, each author reviewed in the first chapter expressed at least one of these concerns.  A 
point I want to emphasize here is that it is important to understand that these criticisms, if they point 
our real concerns for restoration, also apply to the other technologically mediated interactions that we 
have with nature.  Restoration is not unique in its use of technology to alter the natural world and 
shouldn’t stand alone in bearing such criticisms.     
Katz worries that anything we create with technology will be an artifact.  When it comes to the 
use of technology to alter nature, this is a special sort of concern, because we may be changing 
something from nature to artifact.  So the first question to ask here is, does the resulting landscape and 
ecosystem appear to be an artifact? A piece of nature? Or something in between? 
The removal of the Milltown Dam is an especially interesting counterpoint to Katz’s concerns 
about artifactuality and technology.  Katz directly states that the product of technology is necessarily an 
artifact (236).  The dam is obviously an artifact and a piece of technology (Katz even uses a dam as an 
obvious example of something that is not nature).  Removing the dam and the polluted sediments as 
part of the overall restoration of the river required that people intervene with other forms of 
technology, yet what was left seems to be more a part of nature then what came before it.  The 
restored confluence of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork Rivers, the former dam site, is now a functioning 
river bed and flood plain.  Trees, bushes, river rock, and all kinds of terrestrial and aquatic organisms 
now fill a space previously occupied by a hulking mass of concrete clogged by logs, earth, and toxic mine 
tailings.  For human health, the source of pollution that was making its way into well water has at the 
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very least been reduced.  Fish migrations, primarily the threatened Bull Trout, can again take place in 
this area which was once known to the Salish people as a place where these important fish were big and 
abundant.  It is good for the fish, it is good for the people, and it seems that the dam was removed for 
both reasons.  To say that this restored area is an artifact would miss a crucial point.  Yes, there are still 
bridges and walkways, and the reconstructed riverbanks have visible signs of our intentions, but what 
seems most important here is that the current state is an ecological improvement over the prior one, 
and that this improvement could not have taken place without the use of advanced and admittedly 
invasive technology.11 If this area is an artifact, it didn’t gain that status through restoration, it gained it 
through the initial hydrological development.   
Next is the concern that technology will be misused or otherwise used deceptively.  Misuse and 
deceptive use, as they are discussed in the literature I reviewed in the first chapter, are so closely 
related that it is best to consider them together.  This concern goes all the way back to Elliot’s first essay, 
where he was worried that restoration might be used to hide ulterior motives.  Higgs gives an updated 
version of this concern when he wonders if restoration will be a means for corporations to “naturalize” 
their presence, in a sense hiding the destructive nature of their business by engaging in restoration.    
Can a case be made for the Clark Fork doing something like this? Are there corporate interests that are 
hidden from view by the good work that is being done to restore the river?  Concerns of tech fixes, often 
associated with the Deep Ecology distinction between shallow and deep fixes, is also a concern for Katz.  
Is restoration yet another example of a tech fix which superficially appears to address the problem, yet 
perpetuates an underlying problem that caused the issue in the first place?  While many of these 
                                                          
11     While I admit that there may not be a rigorous definition of ecological improvement, I want to argue that 
there are some cases where restoration does improve the ecological state of things quite obviously.  For the Clark 
Fork, I think it should be obvious that having less heavy metals in the sediment of the river is an ecological 
improvement.  Reforesting a clear cut area that is suffering from erosion, siltation of rivers, and so on, is an 
improvement.  Many cases could be in a gray area, but my point should be true as long as there are some 
instances where it is clear to most interested parties that restoration results in an improvement of the ecological 
state of a place.   
Congdon   40 
questions would involve far more inside information about the restoration project than I have access to, 
there are some interesting aspects to consider based on public information.   
Milltown State Park, which now includes an overlook of the Milltown site, is a great example of 
how the concern of deception can be addressed.  Here, a series of informational panels represent 
different stages of history, starting with the Salish people, moving through the periods of industrial 
development, and ending with the removal of the dam.  This is a standing acknowledgement of some 
regrettable events which serves as an important reminder.  It shows that Katz’s expression of 
restoration as a piece of furniture put over a stain in carpet is a possibility, but not an inevitability.  The 
park will remind people for generations that while restoration is a powerful tool, it is also an indication 
that we’ve made costly mistakes.  Part of the “power and promise” of restoration is then the power to 
remind us that it is often our failures that necessitate restoration, and the promise that we will both try 
to repair it and also to seek out new ways of making a living on earth that won’t require it in the future.  
Additionally, although the point was made in the previous section as well, the Milltown Dam is also 
clearly a case where Palamar’s notion of restoration as opening the possibilities for the land, and Higgs’ 
concept of wild design, is met.  Palamar’s notion of restoration and Higgs’ concept of wild design are 
related, but differ in the sense that wild design more explicitly acknowledges a place for human 
intentionality, while still giving priority to ecosystem interests.   
One last point, relevant to both type one and two concerns, I would like to continue to consider 
Palamar’s notion of restoration, its possible shortcomings, and Higgs’ related but distinct condition of 
wild design.  A very unique aspect of the Clark Fork River restoration is the Dry Cottonwood Creek Ranch 
(DCCR).  Overseen by the Clark Fork Coalition, the DCCR is a working cattle ranch adjacent to the Clark 
Fork River in the Deer Lodge Valley (Clark Fork Coalition: Our Working Ranch).  The ranch is leading the 
way for what is called restoration or conservation ranching, which essentially means that they combine 
agricultural, ecological, and economic sustainability.  Additional practices, typically seen as deeply 
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anthropocentric endeavors, are also attaching the term restoration to indicate the integration of 
ecological values, as in the book “Restoration Agriculture” where restoration principles are integrated 
into agricultural practices (Shepard).  Unlike Higgs’ notion of wild design, which emphasizes that 
although culture will always be visible in restoration, ecosystems must be prioritized, the DCCR and 
related operations take practices that were previously focused almost solely on cultural interests and 
integrate ecological ones.  The DCCR has, for example, worked to exclude cattle from portions of the Dry 
Cottonwood Creek to allow for re-vegetation, which in turn cools the water making for better trout 
habitat.  They have also worked on their own ranch, and with others, to reduce the amount of water 
diverted for irrigation from the Clark Fork and its tributaries.  All of this is done while still maintaining a 
viable, grass fed, cattle operation.  Ecological restoration takes the ideals of conservation or 
preservation, ecologically centered ideals, and asks how human technology, intention, and design can 
shape the natural landscapes to benefit ecosystems.  Coming from the other side, operations like 
restoration ranching, or restoration agriculture, begin with human-centered ideals and necessities and 
asks how ecological systems and principles can be used to meet our needs.  In the first, ecological values 
are prioritized and in the second human values are prioritized, but both seem to qualify as restoration 
because they are both, at bottom, attempts to improve upon the health, integrity, or functioning of an 
ecosystem.  Furthermore, in reference to wild design, it seems that the principle underlying this concept 
should be relative to current management practices.  For example, restoration in a wilderness area 
might allow for far less signs of human intentionality and design than restoration of an agricultural area, 
and even less yet, for an urban setting, because the marks of humans are already greater in the latter 
two places, and will continue to be.  Saying that an ecosystem should have priority in an urban 
restoration project might not mean much in a literal sense if there is not a functioning system.  We 
won’t replace buildings with a forest, but planting gardens and tending to urban apiaries on skyscraper 
rooftops still seems like an ecological improvement that warrants the label of restoration.  Additionally, 
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as I will discuss in greater length in the next chapter, even in contexts more closely resembling wild 
landscapes, the limited clarity of, or access to, ecosystem interests will put limitations on what we can 
claim is truly done on behalf of the ecosystem.       
Restoration can be instantiated either by incorporating human elements into ecological 
processes or incorporating ecological elements into human practices, it is interesting to compare 
different notions of restoration.  This idea, instantiated in DCCR’s operation, is an insightful point of 
comparison for Palamar’s notion of restoration, where the cultural role in restoration is restricted to 
opening the scope of possibility for the land.  Expressing partiality for a particular entity within the 
ecosystems seems vulnerable to Palamar’s critique of restorative domination.  While the DCCR 
operation could be seen as allowing for greater self-determination of nature, it is accompanied by a very 
specific practice that on its own, might be seen as dominating.  A cattle ranching operation, after all, 
whether in a traditional mode or the alternative of restoration ranching, still constitutes forcing a strictly 
human vision on the land, which is Palamar’s explanation of restorative domination.  Looking at DCCR’s 
operation, what we see is an improvement, ecologically speaking, through the incorporation of 
restoration principles into traditional land practices.  Going back to Palamar’s basic definition of 
domination as excessive control, through the perspective of restoration ranching or agriculture, it begins 
to seem like excessive control doesn’t tell the whole story of domination.  Rather, domination of nature 
through our management practices stems from a failure to make improvements on behalf of ecological 
entities, or something along those lines.  Concerns related to Palamar’s notion of restoration and Higgs’ 
concept of wild design will be a primary focus in the following chapter. 
 A general take away point from this chapter is that issues that may seem clear conceptually are 
often muddled by the complexity of reality.  This is not to say that problems in theory do not match up 
with the problems in practice, but that it is rarely so straightforward in the context of practice.  In 
recognizing the strengths and weakness of a care perspective in the next chapter, I hope to show that 
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although the means we have to articulate care can at times also be abstract, that it still aligns more 
closely with on the ground morality.  Thus, this chapter was about connecting conceptual issues with 
concrete examples, but also about anticipating the sometimes frustrating, but what I argue is more 
accurate and compelling, complexity, vagueness, and flexibility of a care perspective on restoration.   
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3. Care Ethics: Caring for ecosystems through restoration  
 
“We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a 
community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect.” 
-Aldo Leopold 
 
In this last chapter I will show how a care perspective can contribute to the philosophy of 
ecological restoration.12,13  The first section provides an overview of care ethics and focuses on aspects 
that together comprise my care perspective in this thesis.  The second section places restoration in the 
context of care ethics by exploring the ways that people and ecosystems are mutually dependent.  Given 
the mutual dependence between people and ecological communities, as seen from a care perspective, 
restoration is cast as a critical way to maintain this relationship.  My description of our relationship with 
ecological communities, and the role restoration plays in the relationship, also suggests why care ethics 
is a favorable moral framework to ground restoration.  In the last section I take insights from care ethics 
and apply them to three different issues pertaining to domination in restoration.   
Overview of Care –  
As a scholarly theory, care ethics began with Carol Gilligan’s work in moral psychology.  After 
working with Lawrence Kohlberg, whose studies on the stages of moral development resulted in his 
theory that women are morally deficient and slow to develop, Gilligan sought a different explanation.  
She performed her own studies that cast women’s responses to ethical issues as representing a different 
moral voice, rather than an impoverished one, hence the title of her book, In a Different Voice.  In this 
                                                          
12     Although I refer to multiple feminist philosophies in this thesis, the ethics of care and philosophical 
ecofeminism, my arguments are not directly about gender issues.  Rather, I use these perspectives because they 
focus on issues of domination, personal relationships, caring practices, and responsibility.  They encompass and 
prioritize values that are important for an analysis of restoration but that have been underrepresented thus far in 
the literature.  Furthermore, this chapter does not represent the only way that care ethics, and the related 
perspective of ecofeminism, could be cited in the context of restoration. This is my perspective on a couple of 
issues that caught my attention in the literature.  Others could potentially take care ethics and ecofeminism in 
another direction with regard to restoration, for example, focusing on issues of sexism, classism, and other 
environmental justice issues in restoration.  This chapter is simply meant to bring some further ideas into the 
restoration debate and I want to acknowledge that many of the thoughts have been inspired by the ethics of care. 
13     To my knowledge, there is no published work that explicitly applies care ethics to ecological restoration, and I 
take this chapter to represent my contribution to philosophy of restoration. 
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work she argues that Kohlberg’s work made the false assumption that applying abstract, universal moral 
principles to hypothetical dilemmas, in a sense treating them like math problems, describes the pinnacle 
of moral thought and development for all people.  Instead, Gilligan noticed that women in Kohlberg’s 
and her own studies tended to make moral decisions on the basis of the web of relations that they were 
actually a part of.  Her own studies focused on actual, not hypothetical, situations where women had to 
make difficult moral decisions.  What she found was that their understanding of caring and taking 
responsibility was primary in their decision-making process more than abstract, impartial principles 
about duty or overall utility.  
The ethics of care is grounded in the universal experience and understanding of caring 
relationships. Empirically, it accurately describes how our lives, identities, and ability to flourish are 
intertwined with others.  Normatively, care ethics can be seen as a standalone, alternative theory and 
also as an addition to the perspectives of justice, rights, and utility.  The ethics of care starts with the 
universal experience of care and through reflection on the values, motivations, and ideal standards that 
should guide these universal practices, the theory is continually shaped.  Caring is often seen as a basic 
value and pre-condition without which we would not develop as morally admirable persons who respect 
the rights and values of other people as well as nonhumans.   
Despite the connection to a universally shared experience, care ethics, and care itself, have been 
notoriously difficult to define. There are different versions of care ethics theory which emphasize 
different aspects of relationships including the experience of parenthood (especially motherhood), 
looking after disabled persons, and issues of trust and vulnerability.   
In an effort to find the commonalities between the different theories, Virginia Held, in her book 
The Ethics of Care: Personal Political, and Global discusses features that are common to all versions of 
care ethics.  Care involves values and practice.  There are attitudes, dispositions, and emotions that a 
person must have and continue to cultivate in order to be a caring person.  Caring values alone do not 
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constitute a caring person.  These values must also be put into practice, meaning that the needs of 
others that depend on us are actually met through our actions.  Care is often understood and analyzed 
in contrast with justice.  An ongoing debate in the literature of care asks whether care or justice should 
be primary in moral decision making and action.  Some see care as one virtue among others from the 
perspective of Aristotelean virtue ethics, while many care ethicists argue that it is a related but 
alternative ethical perspective.  In an attempt to summarize what she sees to be important features of 
an ethics of care, Held lists five features. 
First, an ethics of care is focused on meeting the needs of particular others that we find 
ourselves responsible for.  Alternatively, dominant moral theories are focused on maintaining one’s 
rights, upholding duties to social contracts, maximizing overall utility, or improving one’s individual 
virtues.  Second, care ethics values emotions like sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness 
which are needed to cultivate good caring relationships.  Dominant moral theories are known to reject 
emotions and favor abstractness and impartiality.  Emotions are thought of as a form of bias which 
hinder, rather than inform, true ethical conclusions.  Third, the goal of care ethics is cooperative well-
being rather than the traditional ethical goal of mediating conflicts. Fourth, the public-private split of 
dominant moral theory is rejected because care is equally relevant in both places.  Ethical theories have 
traditionally been structured to deal with political, economic, or otherwise disinterested or conflicting 
parties and to overlook the moral issues in the domain of private lives.  Care ethics seeks to recognize 
the importance of ethics in the context of families, the household, and relationships between people 
who have an interest in one another and also to show that justice in the public sphere requires care as 
well.  Fifth, care ethics rejects a liberal individualist view of personhood, a view of people as 
independent, self-sufficient, and autonomous.  Instead, a view of persons as fundamentally 
interdependent and constituted in part by their relationships is favored.  From a care perspective, 
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people still have autonomy but this aspect of our identity is balanced alongside the ways in which our 
lives and identities are intertwined with others.  
Virginia Held addresses the ethics of care in the context of social relationships.  The context that 
care ethics came from is interpersonal relationships but the theory has since entered the context of the 
human-nature relationship.  Karen Warren is well known in environmental philosophy for her work in 
ecofeminism.  While her version of philosophical ecofeminism is not an ethics of care per se, she does 
take a “care-sensitive” approach.  Although Warren stresses that hers is not an ethics of care, it shares 
many features with Held’s account.  For example, both Warren and Held favor a relational view of 
persons and autonomy over an abstract individualist view, respond to issues of patriarchy and 
domination, include the importance of certain emotions in morality in addition to rationality, and 
recognize the importance of both universal and contextual aspects of morality.  In this chapter, Warren’s 
analysis of perspectives in ecological sciences that accord with her care-sensitive ethic are of particular 
interest.  Warren grounds ecofeminism in hierarchy theory in ecology, the view that there a multitude of 
useful perspectives of ecosystems but no single objective view.  She chooses hierarchy theory because it 
matches up with epistemic, ontological, and methodological views of ecofeminism.   Particularly, 
hierarchy theory is similar to ecofeminism because: hierarchy theory gives contextual accounts of 
ecosystems, sees science as theory in process, rejects objectivity as the goal of understanding 
ecosystems, acknowledges bias instead of denying or avoiding it, and it is an inclusive view that 
integrates many perspectives on ecosystems.   
My Care Perspective –   
What I refer to in the remainder of this chapter as my care perspective is a combination of 
themes, ideals, and conditions that I draw from Gilligan, Held, and Warren.  Specifically, I draw on these 
authors and their views on domination, autonomy, conceptualizing selves, others, and their interests, 
and contexts in which partiality overrides impartial moral principles.    
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Beyond the academic motivations, I want to take a care perspective in this thesis because I feel 
that it captures something in environmental ethics that best matches my own intuitions.  In addition to 
studying environmental philosophy I have continued to work outdoors in various capacities.  
Volunteering on a farm that raises native wildflowers for seed, managing a 90 acre wooded parcel on 
the Bitterroot River, and spending my free time hiking, birding, and growing a garden, have each given 
me an opportunity to explore the connection between ethical theory and practice.  Some of the theories 
that I have become familiar with over the last few years, while they are often compelling on paper and 
in the classroom, sometimes feel detached from the reality of my work as a steward of the environment 
(Eric Katz and Paul Taylor are examples).  But seeing plants, animals, and the landscape as bearers of 
rights never seemed to encourage the respect, admiration, or even love that I sensed actually motivated 
me to care about them. While justice and rights are perhaps suited for legal and political contexts, 
rousing people to respond to environmental crises, I have come to believe, has to be rooted in a genuine 
feeling of compassion.   
I will not argue that taking a care perspective on restoration will necessarily improve practices.  
Regardless, I feel that a caring approach is a better one.  This thesis, and this chapter in particular, is a 
small initial attempt to articulate the thoughts, intuitions, and feelings that I have developed during my 
Master’s program.  In this thesis I explore in an academic manner how a care approach can respond to 
issues in the theory of restoration.  At times I worried that I was playing an intellectual game, trying to 
make pieces of concepts fit together rather than identifying things that I thought were true and good.  I 
hope that I have avoided that pitfall and have been charitable to the authors I consider.  
Lastly, I recognize that philosophy has its limits and that whatever we say in the classroom will 
have to be reconciled with the realities that we encounter only through actual hands on engagement.  
The desire to bridge the gap, in at least my own mind and life but hopefully for others, between strong 
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ethical theory and the way that people feel, interact with, and come to care about the environment has 
motivated the thoughts I express here.14     
Restoration in the Context of Care – 
 Certainly, there is nothing new about viewing humans as another member in the community of 
nature.  Many authors, Aldo Leopold in A Sand County Almanac being one example, speak of people as 
being in a relationship with “the land” and as equal members in the “land community.”  Also, such a 
view is embedded in the basic ontological approaches of some cultures, like the varying Native American 
and First Nations people, who, although their specific views differ, share cosmological commonality in 
the kinship model where animals, plants, specific places, and materials are members of one family 
(Warren 86-87).  I do not mean to propose the relational context of care as new, or even that no other 
work on restoration has taken such a view (Higgs speak of “Restoration as Conversation,” on pages 285-
289, for example).  Rather, I want to emphasize how the various views of people as deeply intertwined 
with nature, rather than separate and above, suggests that care ethics is suited well for environmental 
issues, especially restoration.  The views underlying an ethic, the basic ontological assumptions, shape 
the ethic.  Care’s focus on how relationships generate moral responsibility make it a fitting perspective 
for restoration, an environmental issue which powerfully brings out the difficulty of balancing human 
interests and ecological interests.    
As Paul Taylor states succinctly, “We share with other species a common relationship to the 
Earth” (The ethics of respect for nature, 208).  “Relationship” has both broad and narrow meanings in 
everyday use.  Relationship can simply mean that two things are connected, usually explanatorily or 
                                                          
14 To further qualify my care perspective, I should note here that there is a great diversity of thought that falls 
under the heading “care ethics.” Additionally, some care ethicists reject the notion that care ethics can or should 
be applied to domains outside of inter-human relationships.  They would thus reject my application of care ethics 
to the context of restoration.  Other care ethicists, however, would accept such an application of care to 
relationships between humans and non-humans.  I am in the camp of care ethicists who argue that it is valid and 
appropriate to apply care ethics to relationships between humans and nonhumans. 
Congdon   50 
causally, as in “the relationship between the rate of unemployment and economic growth.”  This type of 
use refers to the way two concepts are causally related. 
In a narrower sense, a relationship is a social connection that indicates that a person plays a 
specific role in our life.  We have many kinds of social relationships.  We distinguish between friends and 
mere acquaintances.  In the workplace we have business relationships with bosses, clients, and 
coworkers.  Close friends and family relationships have their own dynamic.  What is significant for a care 
perspective is how a particular relationship generates responsibilities to care.   
Our relationship with nature could be limited to the broad sense only, but I, along with many 
others, want to push beyond this and say that it is more importantly of the specific kind, similar to our 
social relationships in some ways.  Our interactions with nature are not limited to mathematical 
correlations or economic exchanges.  Nature, ecosystems, form our identity, shape us cognitively, 
inspire our creativity, nourish our bodies, give us solace, and teach us humility and respect.   We interact 
with the land daily, even in a culture that constantly finds new ways to further detach us from it.15   
Care ethics often focuses on particular relationships we have but also deals with distant others 
and how to create caring societies.  The models of care that Held talks about with regard to distant 
others and others we do not know personally may be relevant to restoration, but for the sake of 
narrowing the scope of this thesis, I will focus on what care ethics has to say about particular 
relationships.  Since restoration is necessarily performed with actual, particular ecosystems, and in 
acknowledging Higgs’ emphasis on local community engagement through restoration, the models of 
care ethics which deal with our particular personal relationships and home communities are fitting for 
this context.  Additionally, while a care perspective is also fitting in the context of environmental justice, 
                                                          
15     I talk about the scientific understanding of ecosystems and make a distinction between two types of 
ecosystems, those that are “natural” and those that are designed and managed intensively by people.  But unless 
otherwise noted, I use nature, ecosystems, and land or landscape all interchangeably to refer to the nonhuman 
environment and organisms.    
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where the unequal distribution of environmental burdens on groups of people is the focus, I will limit 
my approach to how care speaks to issues between humans and nonhuman nature.   
The first step in applying care ethics to the issues in restoration is to understand the human-
nature relationship and the role that restoration can, does, and ought to play.  I will explain two 
interconnected ways that we can understand a care perspective to be a favorable ethical framework for 
restoration and the role that restoration plays in the human-nature relationship.  The first reason is that, 
descriptively, we are in fact dependent on and interdependent with nature, which includes functioning 
ecosystems.  Who we are is constituted in part by the natural systems that we are in a relationship with.  
The fact of our dependence on and interdependence with ecosystems is foundational to our moral 
consideration for them. 
Second, the kind of relationships that we have with ecosystems shows us that nature has moral 
value and that it deserves our moral consideration.  While there is no way to prove it, many of us share 
the attitude and assumption that nonhuman nature is valuable on its own terms and deserves our moral 
consideration.16  Explanations for why nature has intrinsic value or at least deserves our moral 
consideration vary from the features nonhuman nature shares with us, the experience of pleasure and 
pain, or being a teleological center of a life.  For the purposes of this thesis, I will assume that my reader 
at least shares the latter assumption, that nonhuman nature deserves our moral consideration, and that 
care ethics rightly locates relationships of mutual dependence as a source of moral value that we ought 
                                                          
16      Warren explains, via Joel Feinberg, that the moral considerability of nature is “groundless” in the sense that 
there is not set of premises from which we can deduce the intrinsic value of nature on pages 74 to 76.  Feinberg 
talks about how justifying the equal worth of humans is similar to trying to justify why a parent loves a child.  
Warren cites Feinberg’s conclusion that we can explain the things we love about our children, what led us to love 
them, but we cannot justify or prove that love.  The statement of love is most ultimate or basic evidence that we 
can give.  Stating that we love our children describes an attitude that we have rather than naming a property of 
that relationship.  Carrying that conclusion over to the realm of nonhuman nature, Warren says that nonhuman 
nature is morally considerable to the extent that we take such an attitude toward it.  The attitude is basic in the 
sense that more ultimate reasons cannot be given to justify it.  While there may in fact be features of nonhuman 
nature that make is morally considerable, she states further, it seems unlikely that we will ever be able to prove it 
to the satisfaction of most rational agents.        
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to respond to. The ethical theory that we choose to frame and navigate the dilemmas that arise in our 
relationships with natural systems should also be based on or take into consideration the basic fact of 
our dependence on and interdependence with ecosystems.  Care ethics does just this and is thus a 
favorable theory through which to understand how we should navigate the issues that arise from the 
practice of ecological restoration.   
Care ethics is grounded in the fact that we are all dependent and interdependent on the care of 
others through our entire lives.  The extent to which we succeed in many respects is dependent on the 
quality of care we receive, that is, whether care meets the conditions of good care.  Our existence is 
dependent on our parents, the nurturing needed to make it to adulthood depends on those who look 
after us as infants and children.  In adulthood, our flourishing is interdependent because it is based on 
the collaboration and support with those in our family, community, and larger society.  If parents take 
the time to read to their children, an example of a good caring practice, the children are more likely to 
succeed in school.  Good care prepares us for a life where we are able to flourish and reciprocate the 
care that we have received.   
Moving outside of the social context, we are dependent on, and interdependent with, nature 
and more specifically ecosystems.  What ecosystems are and what we can understand to be in their 
interest will be discussed further in the next section, but a basic definition will be helpful here.  Nature, 
understood as the physical environment which includes nonhuman animals, plants, all other kingdoms 
of life, ecosystems, and the raw materials of life, provides the conditions we need to live.  An ecosystem, 
the unit of life within the whole of nature on which restorationists focus, is “a prescribed unit of the 
biosphere that consists of populations of living organisms that interact with each other and with the 
physical environment that sustains them” (9).  We are dependent on nature for life and our lives are a 
part of the natural community.  Respiration of plants maintain our atmosphere, clean the air and water, 
microbes breakdown and make nutrients available for the plants to live, we and other animals eat these 
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plants, and our evolution was enabled by the eating of animals.  People cannot live without functioning 
ecosystems, whether they be highly managed systems of agriculture or more “natural,” self-sustaining 
systems.  In these very basic ways we are completely dependent on nature, and more specifically our 
existence is intertwined with both naturally and agriculturally functioning ecosystems.17 
Since caring relationships are reciprocal to some degree, that is, both parties depend on the 
other to give and receive care to the extent they are able, we must understand how, if at all, ecosystems 
are dependent on us and how we can care for them.  Just as importantly though, there is an asymmetry 
in many caring relationships, such as those between a mother and infant.  Even so, there are important 
exchanges in asymmetrical relationships.  An infant responds to the mother’s care and a caring mother 
will take that response into account.  For my analysis here, both the asymmetry and the reciprocity or 
exchange between humans and ecosystems is important for describing the state of our mutual 
dependence.   
I see two ways to conceive of ecosystems as dependent on us.  The first kind of dependence 
involves ecosystems that have a higher degree of management, like agriculture systems, where the 
existence and maintenance of the system depends on human care.  The second kind of dependence is 
relevant to those ecosystems more closely resembling “classic” or what I call “naturally functioning” 
ecosystems.  These ecosystems become dependent on human care for their continued existence when 
they become impaired in ways that they do not have the means to recover from on their own.18     
                                                          
17     A “naturally” functioning ecosystem, loosely defined, is one based on a co-evolved community of organisms 
like the Ponderosa forests of western Montana.  An agriculturally functioning ecosystem, loosely defined, is a 
system of species (or a single species in the case of monoculture agriculture) that people have selectively 
domesticated and cultivated for particular purposes.  These two types of ecosystems exist along a continuum, with 
many systems existing as the result of co-evolved species and selective pressure from humans over time.  I make 
this distinction to reflect the fact that we are not as dependent on what are called “classic” ecosystems, what I 
take to be those more closely resembling “naturally functioning” ecosystems, and we are more dependent of the 
biological communities that we have created, what I call “agriculturally functioning” ecosystems.       
18    E.g. heavy metals pollution in the Clark Fork. It may eventually be washed out of the system or very slowly 
degrade, but the timescale for “natural recovery” is longer than the usual timescale assumed for the purposes of 
environmental ethics.  Any environmental problem could be rationalized as non-problematic given a long enough 
timescale, perhaps with the exception of extinction.   
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To begin with, ecosystems are less dependent on us, than we are on them.  Those systems of 
the “naturally functioning” or “classic” kind will not cease to function if humans suddenly vanished.  
Biological communities existed before humans and will continue to exist after our presence has gone.  
However, what I call “agriculturally functioning” ecosystems, those that involve a high degree of 
intentional cultivation and management and are not “self-sustaining” are dependent on us for their 
current and continued existence.  These human-dependent systems require that environmental factors 
like moisture or nutrient availability and processes like weed and pest control, seed harvest, planting, 
and breeding be continually managed.  If people ceased to irrigate, plant, and otherwise give a 
competitive advantage to agricultural species and systems, they would soon fail and be replaced by 
another set of community members and processes.  This is the first way that ecosystems are dependent 
on people. 
The second way that ecosystems become dependent on human care involves “natural” or 
“classic” ecosystems.  The Clark Fork River restoration serves as an example.  While there is some 
agriculture in the area, the river itself, and the aquatic life in it count as a classic or naturally functioning 
ecosystem because the assemblage of organisms present prior to ecological damage would still exist in a 
similar state if it weren’t for human-caused pollution.  And the system would continue to exist without 
the intentional management of people.  When people cause damage to a natural system, and that 
damage is of a kind that the system does not have the means to recover from, it becomes dependent on 
people for its recovery.19  The watershed, as discussed in chapter two, became highly polluted as a result 
of intensive mining in the area.  This type of disturbance is not one that the ecosystem has the means to 
                                                          
19     As is the case with many things, dependence comes in degrees.  Dependence is not a black and white, all or 
nothing feature of relationships.  When I say an ecosystem doesn’t have the means to recover from some kinds of 
disturbance on its own, this is perhaps an overstatement.  Polluted sediment would eventually leave a system like 
the Clark Fork, even if it took thousands of years or more.  However, it seems more useful to think of these issues 
on a shorter timescale.  The polluted stretches have remained polluted for over 100 years. Human intervention is 
the only short timescale solution.  After all, we don’t want to say that nature can recover from anything that we 
throw at it.   
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rebound from or at least has not co-evolved to respond to.  The “slickens,” the zones void of life, 
throughout the watershed are evidence that the watershed ecosystem will not overcome this obstacle 
anytime soon without some help.  Dead zones have remained in place for over 100 years following the 
flood that laced river sediments with pollutants.  Recovery of the polluted system is dependent on 
intentional human management. This system is dependent on our care to remove the obstacles that 
inhibit ecological function.   
Care ethics locates moral significance in relationships, not just in features of autonomous 
individuals.  While some theories of environmental ethics extend moral considerability to nonhumans 
based on shared features, my care perspective in this thesis looks at our relationships with these 
nonhumans.  Restoration is cited, even in SER’s technical guide to the practice, as a way of repairing our 
relationship with nature as well as recovering lost ecological function.  Since we are factually dependent 
on ecosystems, and in contexts which restoration is appropriate, ecosystems depend on us, the 
relational basis of care ethics makes it a favorable theory to ground restoration.   
Moving to the second reason that care ethics is a favorable moral frame work for restoration, 
our dependence on and interdependence with ecosystems creates responsibilities to those natural 
entities.  From a care perspective, our responsibilities to provide care arise from our relationships, the 
kind of dependence and interdependence we have with particular others.  Warren states, “For 
ecofeminist ethicists, how a moral agent is in relationship to another – and not simply the nature of the 
agent or ‘other,’ or the rights, duties, and rules that apply to the agent or ‘other’ – is of central 
significance” (99).  In our social relationships, a person’s ability to flourish depends on being cared for.  
Recognizing this, the ethics of care emphasizes that we all need to receive and reciprocate care to 
flourish.  From a care perspective of restoration then, we should recognize that our mutual dependence 
with nonhuman nature produces responsibilities.  If we depend on others to flourish, and they depend 
on us for the same, then we ought to care for those others for our own instrumental good, for the good 
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of others, and in order to create an environment where care can be perpetuated.  Furthermore, how 
exactly we should care for others with whom we share an intertwined flourishing will depend on the 
particulars of our relationship.  Caring for infants is different from how we maintain caring relationships 
with our adult peers because the needs of an infant and an adult are often times different.  Similarly, 
how we care for different species or places will depend on their needs and the ways that we depend on 
them.  While there may often be elements of utility in our relationships, as I will argue later in this 
chapter, this does not exclude the non-utilitarian elements of these relationships and the response of 
care to them.   
The imperative to care for nonhuman nature comes to life when we realize how deeply we are 
embedded in and dependent on natural systems.  When we overcome the estrangement that our 
modern technological society creates and can clearly see that we are not the rulers and controllers of 
ecological communities but are all mutually dependent knots in a great web of ecological relations, then 
we will be infused with the responsibility to care.  If we could somehow imagine that nature were an 
intentional manager of the land who had our technological means and not us, would we not prefer it to 
be a caring entity?  If we could somehow trade places with the ancient groves of trees, with the deer 
and the river, would we not look at ourselves through their eyes and hope that we would choose to 
accept our responsibility to care?  We can still live a good life to some extent even when we fail to care 
for nonhuman nature as we know from the current condition of things.  Nonhuman nature is not 
reflective and intentional in the same way we are and will not complain in a literal sense about how we 
treat it.  We can treat nature as a commodity for only so long before the effects catch up to us, as they 
now are.  But when we take up the responsibility to care for nature, humans as well as the greater 
ecological community will flourish.  Good care anticipates the future and maintains practices in the 
present that will sustain relationships.  This full realization can be encouraged by explanation, 
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argumentation, and narrative, but finds its true manifestation in the compassionate interpretation of 
and response to one’s lived experiences.     
Our responsibilities are often not of our choosing but come about through circumstance. In a 
social context, we might become responsible for caring for an elderly relative when they become ill or 
unable to fully take care of their basic needs.  Good care in such a case requires that we be sensitive, 
attentive, and responsive to their particular situation.  At a minimum, care involves meeting the needs 
of a particular other.  The inabilities of those needing care dictate what we ought to provide for them.  If 
they cannot eat, get dressed, or otherwise meet their needs on their own, our relationship with them 
requires that we provide what they cannot provide for themselves (whether directly or indirectly). 
 Similarly, human cultivated and highly impaired ecosystems fall under our responsibility as well, 
either because we have setup the conditions that remove their self-sufficiency or because ecosystems 
lack the means to overcome obstacles that we have imposed on them (again, at least not on a short 
timescale). Thus, it seems that we are responsible for removing those obstacles.  Restoration is what 
uniquely enables us to fulfill this responsibility and thereby plays a central role in caring for ecosystems.  
The needs of a particular ecosystem that has been impaired in a way that can’t be overcome by its 
natural processes depends on our caring restoration to meet its needs. 
 What I want to be clear in this section is that the circumstances of our relationship with 
degraded ecosystems are characterized by mutual dependence.  Although the dependence of 
ecosystems on us is different than our dependence on them, we can make sense of a literal 
interdependence.  Dependency and interdependency in relationships is the basic condition from which 
care ethics arises.  The details of the interdependence suggest what the specific responsibilities are that 
we have to nature.  We can also explore the question of what an ecosystem owes us, or more literally, 
the ways in which we are justified in having consumptive interactions with ecosystems.   
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I want to be careful to avoid saying anything that sounds patronizing.  I do not mean to paint a 
picture where ecosystems are at our mercy, feeble children unable to help themselves, and human 
saviors come to their rescue.  We have simply entered into a relationship with ecosystems in both 
positive and negative ways that now require ongoing care for those systems to be maintained.  From our 
relationships with particular ecosystems, specifically those that we have impaired in some way, the 
caring thing to do is begin a process of restoration.  What that process will entail, how it will be designed 
and carried out from a care perspective, requires a further look at the paths that authors Eric Higgs and 
Colette Palamar have begun to pave. 
Three perspectives on domination and a caring response –  
 The previous section took the first step toward a care-based reorientation of the issues in 
restoration.  By reorientation I mean that a care perspective frames issues differently than other 
perspectives in restoration literature.  The reorientation that a care perspective provides pertains to 
how we view ecosystems and the practice of restoration.  For example, a justice-based approach, as 
seen in John Basl’s notion of restoration as restitution, views ecosystems as “the objects of wrongdoing” 
and restoration as a way to compensate for the loss of ecological value (Restitutive Restoration). 
Additionally, on Basl’s view, restoration should be about reforming the character traits of the wrongdoer 
that led to their act of injustice.  Restoration is then focused on ecosystems as objects that have lost 
value and the moral defects in individuals who have damaged ecosystems.  Similarly, Robert Elliot’s 
view, discussed in chapter one, is that restoration fakes or forges nature, much like a painter could forge 
a Monet by replicating it as precisely as possible.  The view that nature can be faked implies a subject-
object view of restorationists and ecosystem. On this view, the human restorationist is an active 
participant and the ecosystem a passive object.  Alternatively, a care perspective’s initial contribution to 
the debate in restoration is to frame restoration as a way to maintain a healthy relationship with 
ecosystems and to view ecosystems (or their community members) as active participants.    
Congdon   59 
Viewing restoration and ecosystems in a relational context is not new to this body of literature 
but the explicit application of an ethical approach which acknowledges the salience of relationships is.  
Higgs, Palamar, Jordan, the Society for Ecological Restoration, and others all imply a relational view.  
However, a care perspective meshes a relational view of restoration and ecosystems with an ethical 
framework that supports it.  Doing so makes a clear connection between a favored way to view 
nonhuman nature, one that is now common in environmental thinking, and an ethical theory that is 
grounded in the reality and ubiquity of relationships (as opposed to rights, justice, or utility views which 
seem to perpetuate a subject-object, culture-nature dualism).   
 But it is necessary to push a care perspective further in the context of restoration to show how it 
can answer questions, frame issues, or problematize assumptions in a unique and helpful way.  To take 
the next step in applying a care perspective to issues in restoration I will focus on three particular issues 
within the broad issue of domination.  Domination in restoration is a concern for Katz, Higgs, and 
Palamar.  Each of their concerns and responses bring out a different aspect of domination in the context 
of restoration.   
Care ethics is concerned with finding good ways to actively care for others while refraining from 
domination.  Like restoration, a general issue in care literature is how to provide for others while not 
overstepping and turning care into a form of paternalism, oppression, or domination.  In the context of 
restoration, care can then help address the difficulty of intervening on behalf of ecological others while 
avoiding domination of nature.  In the following sections I will show how a care perspective can clarify 
and respond to three views of domination in restoration.   
Katz’s view of domination – Ecosystem Autonomy 
 Katz was the first author I considered who cited domination as a central concern for the theory 
and practice of restoration.  He states, “the fundamental error [of restoration] is thus domination, the 
denial of freedom and autonomy” (240).  Restoration is an “attack on the preeminent value of self-
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realization” (240).  On Katz’s view, restoration does not assist the recovery of ecosystems, as SER’s 
definition states.  It destroys nature by replacing it with a human artifact.  An ecosystem’s freedom, 
autonomy, and self-realization are violated or even destroyed, on his view, by the act of restoration.  
Katz supports this claim by drawing a distinction, which I discussed at length in chapter one, between 
natural processes, which create natural entities, and the human creation of artifacts by the intentional 
technology of restoration.   
Underlying Katz’s distinction between the status of natural ecosystems versus artificially created 
human environments (the latter being the result of restoration, in his view) is the deeper conflict of 
nature’s autonomy with human intention and technology.  He takes the two to be mutually exclusive.  
Thus, nature’s autonomy is defined as its ability to maintain self-realization, which, from Katz’s 
perspective is “its own independent [from human technology] course of development” (240).  The 
dichotomy is clear: either nature chooses for itself or humans choose.  Autonomy is expressed through 
free, independent choice, although “choice” for ecosystems must be thought of differently than for 
people, a point I will discuss later in this section.        
 Katz’s view of ecosystem autonomy, the basis of his accusation of domination, and the 
conflicting sphere of human intentions and technology parallel traditional views of liberal individualism 
and the contractual model of social relations that Held critiques in The Ethics of Care.  Liberal 
individualism is the view that persons are autonomous individuals capable of making rational decisions 
free from constraints and bias. In terms of relationships, such a view holds that people can freely choose 
who to engage with and when.  Exchanges between the persons of liberal individualism are those of 
self-interested agents who make agreements only when it is mutually beneficial.  Instead, Held says that 
care “calls on us to take responsibility, while liberal individualist morality focuses on how we should 
leave each other alone” (14-15).   Held claims that the liberal individualist conception of persons is an 
inaccurate description and an impoverished ideal.  Liberal individualism fails to recognize our relational 
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identities, how we are embedded in familial, social, and historical contexts, in addition to our 
independent selves.   Furthermore, we do, and should, make moral decisions from within the 
constraints of these contexts (13-14).   
 Coming back to Katz’s view, we can see from the perspective of liberal individualism why leaving 
an ecosystem alone and refraining from restoration seems to him the only way to respect an 
ecosystem’s autonomy.  Although it may sound absurd, the underlying reasoning seems to be that 
unless an ecosystem “freely chooses” or “agrees” to restoration as a mutually beneficial end, we cannot 
proceed without violating its autonomy.  And because Katz seems to take the view that human interests 
are antagonistic to ecological interests, an ecosystem would not choose any ends that we set for it.  
Carrying over Held’s critique of liberal individualism, I argue that Katz’s way of viewing ecosystems is 
also a false description and an impoverished ideal.     
From the alternative perspective of care, ways of respecting autonomy while still participating in 
our relationship with ecosystems through restorative practices become evident.  Held’s (and some 
others in the care literature) alternative view of autonomy is that of relational or mutual autonomy (55).  
Relational autonomy accepts that we are embedded in various relational contexts and conceptualizes 
free choice as accepting or refusing responsibilities of care, revising or ending uncaring relationships, 
and cultivating new relationships.  The choices made from within relational contexts can then be 
assessed by the standards of good care, rather than mutual but independent benefit alone.  While the 
caring thing to do might sometimes be to leave others alone, it more often requires us to actively 
promote the good of others.  To be caring means to respond to the needs of others and to reciprocate 
the care that others have provided to us when we were in positions of dependency.  The goal of good 
care is a combined flourishing of those in a relationship and restoration can achieve the human, 
ecological, and combined ecocultural goods that make that possible.   
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Drawing on a large body of literature on relational autonomy, Held describes the autonomy of 
caring persons as a set of competencies that allow for self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction.  
At the same time, though, we should also recognize that the very competencies that allow us to achieve 
autonomy are learned from others that we are in relationships with and are honed by practicing these 
competencies in the context of relationships.  Autonomy is not being unencumbered by familial, social, 
and cultural realities, but is created shaped by those realities.  Part of what it means to be a caring 
person in relationships is allowing people the freedom to learn and practice such competencies but also 
to actively help them achieve those goods.  For our management of ecosystems it seems that caring 
restoration should find a balance between hands-off respect for the self-direction of ecosystems and our 
active assistance in recovery which will shape, but not define, ecosystems.  Just as we shouldn’t try to 
create identities for other people, we also shouldn’t create the totality of the identities of ecosystems 
through restoration. No doubt there is a fine line to toe between restoration as a total reflection of 
ourselves and as a hands-off policy.    
To end this discussion I want to bring in some examples from the last chapter to ground these 
two different notions of ecosystem autonomy.  The reality of ecosystems suggests that we can’t think of 
them as free, rational, agents as we do of people.  The Clark Fork watershed cannot be said to have a 
goal for its future in the same way that I have goals for my future.  Perhaps what this watershed does 
have is a telos, or directionality, which generally points toward a future state of sustained populations 
and processes, assuming the absence of catastrophes.  Ecosystem autonomy must be something like its 
ability to react and adapt to changes in the biotic and abiotic environment (what ecologists and 
restorationists refer to as resilience or stability).  Again, in the case of the Clark Fork, the removal of 
polluted sediment removed an obstacle for aquatic life.  Species (or more precisely individuals of a 
species) responded by slowly repopulating formerly fishless stretches of Silver Bow creek and other 
areas.  The adaptive, reactive, capacities of ecosystems and their members are what give us the sense 
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that they self-regulating entities.  Ecosystems are not literally reflective, goal setting entities.  Ecological 
concepts of stability, integrity, and what Higgs refers to as a “historic range of variability” are all 
ecological phenomena related to the independent, teleological expression of ecosystems that form the 
basis of what we could call ecosystem autonomy.   
Thus, ecosystems lose autonomy when their ability to respond to changes is lost.20  Losing the 
capacity for response or correction is how restorationists often define damage or impairment to 
ecosystems. For example, the pollution in the Clark Fork watershed which created slickens, the dead 
zones in the river, would be a clear example of where autonomy of the system was violated.  However, 
it does not seem like all human intervention in ecosystems violates their autonomy, as Katz suggests.  
When we do something that ecosystems do respond to (aside from dying off as a response), like 
prescribed burns in fire suppressed forests and prairies, removing dams from rivers, or cleaning out 
pollution, it does not seem like their autonomy is violated, but is instead increased.   
A care perspective on ecosystem autonomy does not dissolve the notion of self-determination 
for ecosystems, but it refuses to equate it with total freedom from human action.  Just as care suggests 
that humans are not isolated rational agents who choose ends for themselves without consideration for 
their social ties, we should not think of autonomy for ecosystems as free from human presence but as 
the ecosystem’s ability to react, adapt, and flourish within the bounds of reasonable constraint that we 
impose on it.  Our job in caring for ecosystems and respecting their autonomy in the context of 
restoration is to meet the requirements of good care.  Doing this will mean understanding and 
responding to the dependency of ecosystems on us that is caused by our damage and neglect while 
avoiding overbearing, paternalistic tendencies toward creating too much of the ecosystems character 
and identity.  Something that remains to be understood then is when restoration is overbearing, when 
                                                          
20     See Clewell and Aronson’s Ecological Restoration p. 109 for a more detailed account of ecological resilience. 
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our control of ecosystems is excessive, and when it is an appropriate response to our fellow ecological 
community members.  
The view of relational autonomy from Held’s care perspective shows how we can conceive of 
autonomy in spite of constraints that may exist.  For ecosystems, even those that are impaired, the 
potential for self-determination remains.  Although the ecological dead zones in the Clark Fork 
watershed may be examples of where their autonomy has been diminished, our assisted recovery of 
restoration helps to increase the ecosystem’s capacity for self-determination.  If we took Katz’s’ 
rejection of restoration seriously, although he contradictorily states we should clean up our ecological 
messes, respecting the autonomy of the Clark Fork would result in letting natural processes deal with 
pollution on their own terms.  Following the more rigid constraints of individualist autonomy and leaving 
the pollution in place would have prevented aquatic life from returning to the now repopulated creeks.  
As Palamar’s notion of opening the scope of possibilities for ecosystems suggests, restoration in the case 
of the Clark Fork River actually increases the ecosystem’s ability to respond and adapt, increasing its 
autonomy.   
Higgs’ view of domination – Can we care for an ecosystem? 
My conclusion from a care perspective on ecosystem autonomy supports Higgs’ notion of wild 
design.  Relational autonomy, the alternative that care provides to individualist autonomy, shows that 
we can make sense of ecosystem autonomy alongside at least some human constraints and 
intervention.  Relational autonomy, as I suggest, poses the challenge to restorationists of finding a 
middle ground between caring intervention and dominating constraint.  Similarly, Higgs says that the 
challenge of wild design, “lies in reconciling apparently opposite tendencies in restoration: the fact of 
intentionality and the independent character of ecosystems” (273).  In other words, in order to avoid 
domination we need to know what the independent character of an ecosystem is and give it a 
prominent place in the design and implementation of restoration.  At the end of his discussion of wild 
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design Higgs proposes the model of “restoration as conversation” as an intuitive, down to earth model 
for how to achieve balance between the ecological and cultural spheres of interest.  He says,  
A lovely aspect of conversation is that a true conversation implies a sharing of information, 
perspectives, knowledge, and wisdom.  If one person gets the upper hand, it turns into an 
argument, a fight, or the domination of one will over the other (286).  
 
Qualifying his model of restoration as conversation, Higgs understands that, “Ecosystems cannot speak 
in any conventional sense, but attunement to the specific needs of ecosystems allows restorationists to 
represent their interests” (286)   
While Higgs points out this challenge, his account of the “independent character” and “wants” 
of ecosystems doesn’t move out of a scientific (ecological integrity) and historical (historical fidelity) 
understanding and to a moral account.  We need to know more about what an ecosystem is, its 
independent character, its different voice, in order for restoration to be a practice that responds to an 
ecosystem’s call to care.  The science and history of ecosystems are certainly informative but require 
interpretation in order to say what our responsibilities to them are.  Before I move on to how a care 
perspective can contribute to the conceptualization of ecosystems and interests, I want to first 
acknowledge the ways that Higgs’ concept of wild design overlaps with a care perspective.       
Wild design shares many desired values and attributes of the caring person.  Sensitivity, 
sympathy, attentiveness, and responsiveness to a particular others’ needs, which are necessary to 
cultivate and maintain caring relationships, are all themes that Higgs says will enhance our 
understanding of how to make restoration good restoration.  Wild design also shares elements with 
ecofeminism, such as pluralism and inclusivity, when Higgs says that there is not one right way to design 
and restore, but many good forms, and that these good forms will include the cultural, historic, and 
ecological values of the place. Higgs acknowledges that restoration is always a theory and practice in 
process, that it will continually be honed, a boundary condition of Warren’s ecofeminism (Higgs, 272-
273).  Furthermore, he conceives of ecosystems as active participants in restoration, and even as 
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conversational partners.  And in conversing, we need to listen to the unconventional and soft-spoken, or 
as Gilligan and others might put it, the different voice of the ecosystem.  Lastly, “Our connections [to 
place] depend on the practice we engage and on the stories we tell” and the stories told and passed 
down through generations “will enrich the care of place” (285).  Good restoration is a way to care for 
people and nature.   
 The call for restraint in human intervention in nature is necessary to keep unwarranted 
anthropocentrism in check.  But I feel that too much of the work in restoration has passed off 
ecosystems interests as something that science can fill us in on or that we will surely become attuned to 
them if we just do a better job of listening.  I am not rejecting the input of ecologists, but science does 
not tell us everything about the values or interests of an ecosystem.  I am also not rejecting the view 
that personal engagement with ecosystems will tend to improve our practices more than a tech-fix 
attitude.  My position is that referring to ecosystem interests as if they were the interests of a discreet, 
autonomous, independent individual is at times a helpful shortcut, but is inaccurate.  In order to care for 
someone or something we can’t take the shortcut. We need to know who or what actually can be 
known and given care.     
Trying to understand what ecosystems are and what is in their interest opens up a whole cluster 
of questions about individuals, agency, what it is to have interests vs. something being in one’s interest, 
and various scientific concepts of ecosystems.  Each of these issues are areas of ongoing contention, and 
I cannot address all of them here.  For the purposes of this section I will suggest some ways that we can 
conceive of ecosystems and how these conceptions suggest care should respond.   
In developing her care-sensitive ecofeminist ethic, Warren draws on hierarchy theory in 
ecosystem ecology to talk about what ecosystems are.  Traditionally, ecologists have argued about what 
the best, most objective, view of ecosystems is.  Hierarchy theory rejects the view that there is a single 
correct objective view of ecosystems.  Instead, according to Warren’s understanding, hierarchy theory in 
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ecology suggests that how an ecosystem is defined, how we view its component parts, and how the 
boundaries are drawn depends on the questions ecologists are asking, the methods they will use to 
collect data, and other considerations.  Simply, what we call an ecosystem is a human construction.  This 
does not deny the fact that there are varying degrees of connectedness between organisms and the 
abiotic environment in an area.  But it does reject the idea that we can think of an ecosystem objectively 
as an individual.  This issue is certainly up for debate within ecology and environmental ethics, but for 
now I will leave the status of ecosystems as helpful human constructions.   
So what does this view of ecosystems mean for a caring perspective of restoration?  First off, if it 
is true that there is no objective view of ecosystems as individuals, literature in restoration shouldn’t 
treat the sphere of “ecosystem interests” as if it is a unified set of goods that favor a particular entity.  
While choosing a particular view of ecosystems is useful for scientific research, for the purposes of 
ethics it seems that it will be better to focus on either providing the basic conditions of life for all 
organisms or caring for particular entities below the ecosystem level (individuals, populations).     
Looking to how a care perspective responds to particular social or familial relationships versus 
our participation in community and society level relationships is helpful.  We can have caring values and 
engage in practices of care towards particular others that we are in a relationship with and we can 
contribute to the existence of caring communities.  Caring for particular others and contributing to a 
caring society both require that we cultivate and act on the same set of values and emotions.  Care for 
close family relationships and promoting a caring environment are both grounded in the universal 
experience of care.  Held argues that while early perspectives on care limited it to the private domain of 
the home, family, and friends, care is also relevant in the public and global domain.  
 Although the basis of care is the same for particular others as it is for communities and society, 
the approach and goals differ.  Caring for particular others requires that we know their specific interests, 
desires, and preferences well enough to be able to respond in a way that shows we are sensitive and 
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sympathetic to them as the individuals they are.  Care for particular others reflects that we have an 
understanding of them that goes beyond the general things that everyone else also needs and desires.   
Contributing to the existence of a caring society or community, alternatively, aims at creating an 
“environment of trust,” creating the pre-conditions for respecting the rights of others, and fostering the 
connectedness that motivates others to reciprocate care.  While a liberal approach assumes the 
establishment of rights and universal toleration as the starting point, a care perspective claims that a 
pre-requisite for liberal democratic society requires that people care enough about others and having a 
fair society to actually respect others and tolerate differences.  We can presume that caring for 
community and society would involve things like participating in community events that bring people 
together, maintaining the vibrancy of public spaces, and other activities that would promote the feeling 
in the community that there is mutual consideration and solidarity.  Essentially, caring for communities 
indirectly cares for individuals while care for particular others is direct.  For communities we ought to 
help provide the basic conditions necessary for a caring community to exist.   
I want to suggest something similar for how restoration can be a caring practice for ecosystems.  
I do not think that ecosystems are in fact individuals in the sense that they have a set of interests unique 
to them that can’t be reduced to the interests of the organisms that ecosystems are composed of.  
Given that, caring restoration could be seen to have two basic approaches.  For the whole of the 
ecological community we can practice care in the sense that we help to provide those ecological goods 
shared by all.  This would be the basics of clean air, water, soil, and refraining from unnecessary 
development that generally tends to decrease ecological function in one way or another.  The removal 
of pollution, dams, and other obstacles that generally inhibit ecological function should be the basic goal 
of caring restoration.  This general form of care for ecological communities is quite similar to Palamar’s 
goal of creating the conditions that open up possibilities for the land.  However, I think we can go 
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beyond this basic goal and practice restoration as a form of care for the particular relationships we 
might have with members of ecological communities. 
Taking the Clark Fork as an example, we can think of the ranchers working on Dry Cottonwood 
Creek Ranch.  They have a particular relationship with the land as ranchers.  Beyond the cattle and fields 
of alfalfa, these ranchers actively engage with the more “wild” members of the land community such as 
the wolves, deer, elk, songbirds, trout, Ponderosas, dogwoods, and Bitterroot.  And these interactions 
can be judged and altered to be more or less caring as they engage in what I earlier called restoration 
ranching.  It seems that because of their history with the land and their role in the ecosystem as it now 
exists, these rancher-restorationists should be able to go beyond the basic care of the land community 
and foster their relationship with the creeks they fish in, or the wild grasses that their cattle prefer in 
spring.  But what does a care perspective have to say about this kind of partiality? Can we show a caring 
favoritism in restoration? Or will this just be another opening for accusations of restorative domination?  
Palamar’s view of restoration brings up issues of impartiality as it relates to restorative domination.  
Returning to her views provides the context for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of a care 
perspective on partiality in restoration.  
Palamar’s view of domination – Impartiality and favoritism in restoration 
 Palamar defines domination as excessive control.  Restorative domination, that is, excessive 
control exerted by restorationists over nature, occurs when specifically human visions for the land and 
arbitrary human ideals are forced on the landscape and ecosystem members.   As Palamar puts it, 
“Restorative domination occurs for a variety of reasons, including (1) the choice of a rather arbitrary 
historical ideal, (2) the difficulty of developing complete species lists, and (3) the fact that current 
species compositions include both nonnative and naturalized plants and animals” (287-288). 
Congdon   70 
 Drawing on four of Warren’s eight21 boundary conditions (inclusivism, pluralism, questioning 
objectivity, and theory in process), Palamar concludes that the way to avoid restorative domination is to 
make restoration “a process by which we set up the conditions that open the scope of possibilities for 
the land.  These restorative conditions will also encourage parameters allowing the land to participate 
actively in outcomes” (294).  For Palamar, domination stems from arbitrary human ideals being imposed 
on the land.  Instead of human ideals having priority, the focus and goal for restoration is creating the 
greatest number of possibilities or choices for the land.  She even states that if a species decreases 
possibilities for other species, they should be removed (294).  Why is it that possibilities or choices for 
the land is the greatest good to aim at?22  
 The ideal that Palamar sets for restoration is a good starting point and in some cases it may be 
all that we should do (perhaps in Wilderness areas, for example).  Furthermore, a care perspective, as I 
have described it, would encourage providing the basic conditions for all life.  However, I do not think 
that opening the scope of possibilities for the land should be thought of as a necessary restriction on 
restoration such that if we cross it we have dominated the landscape.  My position is that Palamar’s 
view unintentionally supports an impartiality that precludes the possibility for restoration to reflect our 
personal relationships with members in the land community.  Quoting Warren,  
Care-sensitive ethics permits that special relationships, particularly dependency relations, 
provide contextual reasons for not treating all interests equally. It does not do this carte 
blanche: It is not always moral to act on one’s preferences, especially if so acting violates the 
care practices condition or keeps in place unjustified practices of domination (Ecofeminist 
Philosophy, 134). 
 
                                                          
21     Found in both the article “The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism” and her book Ecofeminist 
Philosophy, Karen Warren explains eight boundary conditions that delineate necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions for ecofeminist ethical theory building.  These eight conditions are: opposition to oppressive -isms of 
domination, it must be a contextual ethics, it should pluralistic, inclusive, a theory in process, question objectivity, 
recognize values often ignored by traditional theories, and reject abstract individualism as it reconceives of the 
self.     
22     Her justification comes from Warren’s boundary conditions of inclusivism and pluralism, but it is unclear to me 
how such a prescription is not also arbitrary in the context of ecosystem composition.  For example, that are 
ecotypes that are known to have low diversity and it doesn’t seem necessarily like a good thing to add more 
species to the area if we were to restore it.   
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From a care perspective, impartiality is appropriate in some contexts but shouldn’t be thought of as a 
universal prescription for right action.  Instead, a care perspective looks at instances where partiality is 
acceptable and perhaps even favorable over impartial moral principles.  In a hypothetical that Held 
considers, two children are drowning, one of which is the child of a nearby parent.  The parent can only 
save one child and they choose their own.  A utility view of this dilemma might ask which child’s life is of 
the greatest value or a Kantian approach would try to establish a universal principle to make the 
decision.  A care perspective recognizes the harsh reality of such a choice but does not let the 
impartiality of utility or rights override the fact of the bond between parent and child.  The minimum 
that this example shows is that there are at least some circumstances where partiality based on 
personal relationships overrides the impartial view from utilitarianism where people are vessels of utility 
and or from duty which demands equal respect in response to equal rationality.  While this example is 
extreme, I wonder if there is a way to understand something similar, a warranted, caring kind of 
favoritism in restoration.  
The first kind of favoritism that a care perspective might recommend has to do with the places 
that we choose to restore.  The goal of opening the possibilities for the land explains one reason why we 
should restore the Clark Fork River.  Pollution has reduced the possibilities for many species in the area. 
My care perspective adds the community and relationships sustained in the area to the reasons to 
restore.  Those living in the Clark Fork River valley have a relationship with the place and share in the 
burden of pollution.  Removing polluted sediment is a practice that promotes intertwined flourishing of 
all the community members.  But it could also be seen as a warranted kind of favoritism to place.  If 
increasing the number of possibilities is the primary goal for restoration, there could be other places 
that have been impaired even more.  However, while a care perspective does at time emphasize ways to 
care for distant others, it seems that the relationship and mutual dependency between the river valley 
and its human inhabitants justifies them in favoring the place they call home.    
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A second kind of favoritism might stem from recognizing a particular vulnerability of a species.  
Held says that caring overrides impartiality when we have a “responsibility for a vulnerable being in 
need of one’s care” (92).  In the Clark Fork restoration a special emphasis has gone to tributaries and 
stretches of the main river that run through agricultural land.  Irrigation diversion and cattle have 
resulted in a reduction of vegetation on the banks of streams, water flow is reduced, water 
temperatures have increased and oxygenation has decreased.  Native trout are particularly vulnerable 
to such conditions and thus restoration efforts have been tailored in response.  Restoring the conditions 
that are favorable for trout certainly opens up the scope of possibility for those fish and other aquatic 
organisms.  But leaving the streams as they were would have kept open the possibility for other species 
of fish and aquatic life that are better adapted to warm, oxygen poor conditions.  Re-vegetating stream 
banks and excluding cattle opened up possibilities for more trees and shrubs, but before there were 
more possibilities for grasses and forbs to live in the stream bank environment.  My point here is that 
increasing possibilities for the land does not provide adequate means to make decisions in restoration.  
It is not always so simple a matter as seeing which options would increase possibilities the most.  While 
other species besides the trout were certainly vulnerable, our understanding of what these native fish 
need have come from a relationship with them.  Fewer people have an understanding and relationship 
with the other aquatic and riparian life that is equally as vulnerable as the trout.  Recognizing specific 
vulnerabilities of species or other entities through our relationships with them is one way that a care 
perspective can make sense of favoritism and show how it can assist in making necessary decisions.  
Lastly, another kind of favoritism that my care perspective could at times support is for 
culturally important plants, animals, or places, what Higgs might describe as being part of a “storied 
landscape.”  Though it may walk a fine line between utility and relationships in the eyes of some, 
favoring plants like huckleberries, blue camas, or others that are harvested annually and are a part of 
the cultural heritage for various groups (historically native American groups, but also European settlers 
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who have made it a family or community practice) in an area is another kind of partiality a care 
perspective can consider as salient moral input.  Not only do these species have use value but they are 
also partners in a particular human-nature relationship.  On the one hand it seems that we should follow 
the guideline of creating more diversity and possibility, thereby refraining from promoting these plant 
species over others.  But on the other hand, we would not want to use our relationship with these plants 
to justify creating a monoculture (as we have with corn in the Midwest, a practice that I believe a care 
perspective would object to).  While my care perspective does not give us principles to know exactly 
when partiality has gone too far, it does suggest that there is some degree to which we can understand 
favoritism to be a form of care for nonhuman nature that also satisfies some of our own needs.      
In the end, the care perspective that I develop shows a few ways that a relational view of 
restoration could and sometimes should override impartiality.  Sometimes it is caring relationships that 
should have priority over impartial moral principles.  We should at the same time be wary of using 
personal relationships as a justification for acting purely on self-interest.  Responding to favoritism in 
restoration should be limited to when it is truly an expression of a caring relationship.  If partiality goes 
too far in promoting one voice in the ecosystem over all others, we should think of Warren’s condition 
of inclusivism and pluralism, or even insights from utilitarianism and rights, to understand when care has 
become the kind of domination it seeks to diminish.   
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Conclusion: 
 As the debate over ecological restoration has evolved, more authors have come to focus on the 
issue of domination.  On a theoretical level, arguments like Katz’s, judging by how many times he has 
been cited, are compelling to many readers.  However, when we stand on the ground and observe the 
day to day activities of restorationists, or participate in restoration ourselves, the gap between some 
theoretical approaches and the reality of the practice become clear.  Domination is not the sort of 
feature that we can directly look at in a restoration project.  Yet it rouses the concern of many people 
who care about nonhuman nature and good environmental practices.  For this reason, philosophy of 
restoration will be improved when, like Higgs, authors experience and participate in the activities for 
which they form theories.  Participation, I believe, will both clarify the gap between theory and practice 
and motivate us to engage in alternative theories like the ethics of care.   
The ethics of care may be seen by some as deficient because it lacks the rigidity and clear 
applicability of traditional rights and utility theories.  But in its flexibility also lies its strength.  For 
restoration, a care perspective mediates between the world of theories and the world as we experience 
it.  Such a perspective can recognize our emotions, intuitions, relationships, and history as valid input for 
moral decision making without succumbing to total relativism.  The ethics of care also has the potential 
to help support some means of restoration over others (like controlled grazing instead of herbicide 
application to control weeds on a rangeland, or genetic swamping as opposed to piscicide for controlling 
invasive fish species in wilderness lakes).  As a practice that represents a diversity of personal, cultural, 
and ecological interests, restoration is well supported by the complexity and thoughtfulness of care.  A 
care perspective, like the one I have developed here, can help us clarify and respond to the middle 
ground of restoration between a hands off management policy and the danger of engineering the 
independent identity out of nature. 
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This thesis only scratches the surface of what can be said about restoration and other 
environmental practices from a care perspective. I feel that I will have succeeded if I only convince 
people that care, compassion, and responsibility are rigorous enough moral structures that they can 
potentially lead to the improvement of practices like restoration.  Further, a relational view of 
restoration does not mean that we have to take a spiritual view of nature as in Gaia theory.  Our 
relationship to nonhuman nature is literal, direct, and calls for our consideration.  Restoration should be 
defended as a caring practice that gathers people and communities to recognize and engage their role in 
the greater ecological community.  Although argumentation cannot prove it, caring for the environment 
around us is a way to ensure a future of intertwined flourishing.  Our challenge and responsibility is to 
go out and show that this is true.   
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